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REVIEW
OF THE
AUSTRO-ITALIAN WAR, 1866.

CAPT W. J. WYATT



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ARCHDUKE ALBRECHT

REVIEW

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A
POLITICAL AND MILITARY REVIEW
OF THE
AUSTRO-ITALIAN WAR OF 1866,
WITH AN ACCOUNT OF THE
GARIBALDIAN EXPEDITION TO THE TYROL,
A REVIEW OF THE FUTURE POLICY OF ITALY,
AND
HER PRESENT FINANCIAL DIFFICULTIES.

BY
CAPT. W. J. WYATT,
(UNATTACHED)
FORMERLY OF THE RADETZKY HUSSARS.



LONDON:
EDWARD STANFORD, 6, CHARING CROSS, S.W.
1867.

246. e. 62.



P R E F A C E.

A PERSONAL acquaintance with many of the scenes herein described, must be the author's apology for submitting his impressions to the criticism of the public; besides which, the sources from which the materials for this Review have been derived, are connected with a personal knowledge of the Italian territory, and a long residence in Austria, during and subsequent to the late War. The author has also availed himself of the best military reports which have emanated from the respective belligerent powers; and he cannot deprive himself of the opportunity to express his sincere gratitude for the unbounded hospitality and kindness shown to him, by His Imperial Highness the Archduke Albrecht during the period he was temporarily attached to his staff, and also to all the officers of that Imperial Army, (under whose banners the author himself formerly had the honor of serving) from whom he received every facility and consideration.



ERRATA.

- Page 22, line 4, *for* " July 24th" *read* " June 24th."
- 33, " 27, *for* " over" *read* " on."
- 37, Note *, *for* " Campagna" *read* " Somma Campagna."
- 39, " †, *for* " unction" *read* " junction."
- 44, line 23, *for* " togards" *read* " towards."
- 48, " 25, *for* " not" *read* " only."
- 68, " 2, *after* " Storo," *insert* " and."
- 91, " 2, *for* " upwards" *read* " upwards of."
- 120, " 17, *after* " Russia," *insert* " viz. to prevent the alliance
of Austria with Italy."

CHAPTER I.

Description of Italy and the Political parties existing after the
Battle of Solferino.

THE Alliance of Italy and Prussia was a temporary necessity for Italy and a permanent one for Prussia.

Every sober-minded Italian must agree that as soon as Italy obtained Venice the necessity for the Alliance ceased, and that its continuance in any shape whatever would be tantamount to a declaration of War towards Austria and France; and it could not be natural, as Prussia is founded on the divine rights of kings; Italy on those of the people.

But Prussia will do her utmost to induce Italy to believe that their Policy is identical, viz., to rule over all nations who speak a dialect similar to their own, in order to force Austria and France to concentrate large bodies of Troops on the Italian frontier, and thereby weaken the Austrian and French troops concentrated towards the Prussian territory.

Can any Italian for one moment suppose that Austria and Switzerland will give up their best provinces? Are the Hungarians, Sclavonians and Croats prepared to give over to Italy the only

outlet they have to the sea, on which mainly depends their future prosperity. The cause of the re-union of Italy is not to be traced solely to the idea of Nationalities. It was the common commercial interest of the Italian people which drew them together, there is no reason to suppose that a number of people who may happen to be under different rulers should, on account of their speaking a similar language, wish to be united together; for example, why did that part of Belgium which speaks the Dutch tongue unite itself to Belgium? What was the cause of the unity of Switzerland? The inhabitants of Alsace and Burgundy, who up to the present moment still speak a dialect similar to that of Germany, and formerly belonged to that Empire, are known to be determined Frenchmen, and, lastly the late War between the Northern and Southern States of America, which was solely occasioned by a difference of commercial interests. Italy will shortly have to choose which of the two paths she intends pursuing—a Prussian or an Austrian. Without a doubt there existed in Italy after the peace of Villa Franca three parties, the moderate Liberal, the Clerical and the Patriotic Republican party. The moderates, in order to crown Victor Emanuel King of Italy, knew it was necessary to introduce a sound system of finance, a re-organization of the laws, and a thorough distinct classification of the different grades of society; in order to effect these it was necessary to come to some compromise with

the Austrians to induce the former Sovereigns of Italy to return as subjects of the Italian King, with the titles of Royal Dukes. They knew if this was once effected the purchase of Venetia and the occupation of Rome would be only a matter of time, and they felt that the immense private revenues which the Royal Dukes were spending in Foreign countries would be very acceptable to the Italians, also that trade was greatly depressed in their former capitals, which naturally would create a feeling of discontent amongst the lower orders. They knew that there was not the slightest fear of Austria attacking them either by sea or by land, and all that Italy required was a small national army and the principle of our Volunteers to be carried out to the fullest extent. Had they been able to pursue this plan, a few years later their brightest aspirations would have been crowned with success, but their greatest enemy was the old Clerical party, which unfortunately supposed that the alliance of a Liberal united Italy with Austria would be the downfall of the political power of the Pope, which would nearly amount to the loss of every political influence they possessed. They therefore did all in their power to prevent this union.

Let us not be too severe on the priestly party; we know it will never do for the Church to head reform, for whenever she has done so she has met with a check. In ancient times, when learning

was chiefly to be found amongst the priests, they took the lead, as it was their duty. After the battle of Solferino, the Austrian priesthood had to decide between three parties, the high conservative or ultramontane, the moderate, and the republican. Power is sweet. Priesthood has guided both spiritual and temporal power in Austria and Italy for centuries. The moderates were the weakest party, and the Pope had already tried his hand at Republicanism. From the above statements the reader must think it was but too natural that the Italian and Austrian clergy should make common cause with each other.

The writer, although not a Romanist, takes the liberty of attempting to defend the priests of Italy. The Italians often condemned the morality of their clergy, but no one can suppose that the doctrines of the Roman Catholic Church lead to immorality. A priest is but a man, and men are generally influenced by the state of society which surrounds them: we all are weak, and the life of a priest in a climate such as that of Italy is not exactly conducive to foster virtue. The two great temptations which a priest has to encounter are the domestic life which Italians themselves lead and the custom of female confession. The great doctrine of bringing up children in the way they should go ought to be the guiding principle of Italian parents, and above all things it should be remembered that it is easier to reproach others than to be faultless yourself.

In conclusion, we beg to submit the following remarks of a well-known Protestant writer in reference to Catholic Priests and their Religion. In order to show that the Priests, as well as those who are often ridiculed by their own countrymen for constantly frequenting their churches, are considered by enlightened travellers to do so not for mere outward show. "The fervour of devotion among these Catholics, the absence of all worldly feelings in their religious acts, strikes every traveller who enters a Roman Catholic Church abroad. They seem to have no reserve, no false shame, false pride, or whatever the feeling may be, which amongst us Protestants makes the individual exercise of devotion private, hidden, an affair of the closet. Here and everywhere in Catholic countries you see well-dressed people, persons of the highest as well as of the lower orders on their knees upon the pavement of the church, totally regardless of and unregarded by the crowd of passengers in the aisles moving to and fro. I have Christian charity enough to believe, and I do not envy the man's mind who does not believe, that this is quite sincere devotion and not hypocrisy, affectation, or attempt at display."

Events of the present day compel me to say that, although I have attempted to defend the Roman Catholic clergy in the foregoing pages on the principle that we all have our faults, the manly policy

of the late Italian Prime Minister, who has caused a dissolution of Parliament, leads us to believe that Papacy has now in her hands her own fate. If she comes forward with concessions which the present times require, and unite herself to the Moderate party, she would become the permanent and State Religion of Italy. But if a Democratic Chancellor of the Exchequer comes into office before the Church property question is settled, I think it probable he will take over the entire Church property and allow a certain sum to be voted for the keeping up of the Italian Church, by which means he would be enabled to meet the pressing demands on the Italian Exchequer.

I shall now proceed to describe the Republican party. The Republicans and Patriots could not bear the indignity of having had to give up Savoy and Nice to the French at the price of their partial freedom; they therefore conceived the idea worthy of the descendants of Rome, that they would either gain everything by the sword or again be ruled by the foreigner, they preferred rather to reduce their country to nearly a state of bankruptcy and the destruction of thousands of their own brothers than pay the stranger one farthing—a sentiment which may be considered sublime, but not practical or adapted to the age in which we live. They did not for one moment consider that what they thought was practicable,

namely, the capture of Venetia and the Quadrilateral, and the spoliation of some of Austria's best provinces, on account of pretended claims of nationality, were that which the greatest warriors and statesmen of Europe had considered an impossibility. In order to effect this it was necessary to create a fleet and an army equal to that of Austria, and with that fleet and army to obtain possession of Venetia, Rome, a part of the Tyrol and Istria. Italy has one great danger to avoid. She runs the risk of being made the tool of Prussia, who will endeavour to foment disagreement and feuds on the Roman question.

In this endeavour she will find in Russia a willing ally, and indeed, that Power will probably embrace the first opportunity of bringing about an indirect alliance with the House of Savoy. Russia would greatly gain thereby, and also by the fall of the temporal power of the Pope, and by the consequent extension of the influence of the Greek Church over many a nationality professing the Catholic religion, and the probability that Italy will assist the Christian subjects of the Porte.

Not that I believe much in the disinterestedness of Russian motives, for it is to the interest of the Czar to hasten the end of the "sick man."

Still, Italy has to avoid going too far, for France may yet return to the protection of the patrimony of St. Peter; and Spain too would be willing to aid in such a Holy Crusade, which would not only

be popular throughout the Peninsula, but would withdraw men's minds from the terrible position of home affairs—would cause a fusion of parties, and strengthen the tottering power of the Spanish throne.

CHAPTER II.

Description of the Strategical Bases of Italy and Venetia,
and their Geographical relations.

THE following campaigns prove the nature of the desperate enterprise which the Italians undertook in attempting to drive the Austrians out of Venetia. The campaigns of Buonaparte in the years 1796 and 1797; the war of 1805 to 1809; of 1814 and 1815, when Murat made his celebrated flank movement against Austria; together with other campaigns up to the present moment, including those large operations in the campaign of the year 1797; depended mainly more or less on the skilful manœuvring on the connecting lines. The true value of these lines of communication for the defence of Venetia depends entirely upon the army, which is operating in their defence, having its reserves so posted that they can be concentrated on any given point when required. In case of the Austrians having to retreat, or to be reinforced, we find the principal line of communication is that which leads from Vienna to Trieste by way of Laibach and Gratz, and from thence it stands in communication with Nabresina, Görtz, Udine, Treviso, towards Mestre and Venice. From Mestre it branches to Padua, Vicenza, and Montebello, to Verona and Peschiera.

The strategical line of frontier commences from the Ortler Spitz and runs along the Alpine mountains up to Trent. It then runs along the Mincio, until the junction of that river with the Po. Here Austria fronts towards Lombardy. From the mouth of the Mincio Austria fronts the Romagna and Modena. She possesses the most perfect lines of communication from all points. Opposed to the Austrian basis we find Piacenza at the corner of a triangle which possesses several lines of communication. The northern basis can be taken as extending from the Piacenza line of Railway to Milan, Bergamo, and Lecco, and to the northern shores of the Lake of Como. The south-eastern boundary is formed by the Railway from Piacenza to Parma, Modena, Bologna, Rimini, and Ancona—a large naval port on the Adriatic. In front of the first-mentioned basis we find the Italians possess further lines of communication over the Po, between the northern and southern boundary, viz., the bridges of Cremona and Casalmaggiore. The Mincio line must be considered by all who have seen it to be perfect. First, we find on both sides of the Adige the important fortress of Verona. Farther down the Adige is Legnano. On the Mincio, and at the end of the Lake of Garda, is the important fortress of Peschiera; and, lastly, Mantua on the Po. Verona stands in direct communication with Peschiera and Mantua. Farther up from Verona are situ-

ated the fortified entrenchments of Pastrengo, Ceradino and the fort Traniens. The front of the lower Po is not so well defended. To the east of Legnano is Venice with her forts, which prevent any attack being made from the sea coast or the sea; to the east of Venice is Palmanuova and Osoppo, behind them Gradisca on the Isonzo. From the mouth of the Po to that of the Isonzo no naval attack would be practicable.

On the sea-coast of Istria, lies the important town of Trieste in direct railway communication with Vienna. It is generally considered a neutral port, but is defended by some very passable strand batteries. Austria's principal naval ports on the Dalmatian frontier, are Pola, Zara, Lissa and Ragusa, none of which at the commencement of the war were in an efficient state of defence. I will now mention the roads which communicate with the Austrian front from Roveredo, to Schio and Vicenza. Secondly, the road through the Val Sugana, from Trent to Bassano and Padua. Lastly, the road from Botzen, through the Valleys of the Rienz and the Drave; and from here to Villach and Marburg. There are other connections through the Railway lines of Marburg, Laibach, Trieste and Vicenza; from Niederndorf and Innichen to the Valley of the Piave, and the towns of Belluno, Feltre and Conegliano. From Villach to Tarvis, Ponteba and Osoppo; from Villach to Tarvis and the Predil Pass to Görz.

Venetia can be attacked in several different ways. The best way, no doubt, would be from the line leading from Bologna over the Lower Po to Rovigo and Vicenza, assisted by a fleet of gunboats. Bologna could be reinforced from Milan by rail at the rate at least of two divisions of infantry daily, without mentioning the reinforcements which could be poured in from Florence by Southern Italy.

A corps d'armée, if stationed at Casalmaggiore, could reach the neighbourhood of Bologna in three days by forced marches. Therefore, without doubt, Italy could mass in three or four days large numbers of troops between Bologna and Ferrara. If the main body of the Italian army intended attacking Venetia from Bologna over the Lower Po, Lombardy would be naturally left unprotected. There is no doubt that the large mass of volunteers which Italy has might be considered well adapted to the defence of Lombardy; but I am of opinion that no national volunteer force is of any use if taken from cities to defend another part of the country when they know that the enemy is threatening the cities from whence they came, and there is no doubt they can be of great use in pursuing a beaten army. If the Quadrilateral is properly garrisoned, the Austrian army defending Venetia, although inferior in numbers, would be always superior to the attacking forces, but in case of these fortresses being insufficiently garrisoned, and Venetia attacked on two sides, Verona could be taken.

I may further and finally remark that during the Italian wars the neighbourhood west of the Lake of Garda and north as far as the boundary of Graubunden (Grisons) was of more or less importance. An Italian army invading Venetia may arrive in this neighbourhood by comparatively easy stages. The important Austrian line of communication of the Adige is connected with the same ground by marching over Riva along the Lake Garda or the Lake Idro over the Caffaro, or the Tonale through the Val Camonica and out of the Valteline over Teglio and Edolo. Any demonstration against the line of the Adige would be judicious, in so much as it keeps the Austrian troops from the Venetian main theatre of war.

The *invasion* of the Southern Tyrol by the Italians has been repeatedly spoken of before and during the war. For this purpose the Italians would require considerable masses of troops, while any *demonstration* could be effected by comparatively few troops, and according to the rules of the art of war we should never work out several important objects at one and the same time, but one after the other. The fall of Venetia means the capture of the Quadrilateral, and this does not only require the united strength of Italy, but also a considerable length of time. If the Italians should desire to conquer southern Tyrol at the same time, they would by dividing their forces weaken their strength to such a degree as to be en-

feebled on all points, or by their bad combination, get led into false lines of operation. But the Italians went even farther in their presumption, they even spoke of marching their left wing through the Tyrol and Bavaria, to operate in the rear of Prussia's German enemies. We have mentioned the consequences of dividing her forces by invading South Tyrol, and we leave it to the reader to imagine the consequences which would have followed a partition on a larger scale. Formerly Italy and her allies were restrained from invading South Tyrol, because it belonged to the German Bund; but since Prussia, and, with her, nearly the whole of North Germany, retired from the Bund, this cause for avoiding the invasion of South Tyrol no longer exists. Venetia, which was the last portion of Italy held by the Austrians, consists of the north-eastern portion of the Italian mainland, reaching from the Alps to the lower course of the Po, and from the Adriatic westward to the stream of the Mincio. The tract of country thus limited embraces the provinces of Venice, Padua, Verona, Vicenza, Treviso, Belluno, and Friuli, together with a small portion of the former Lombard province of Mantua, including the city of that name. This kingdom is defended by the celebrated Quadrilateral. The principal fortresses of this great European stronghold are Venice towards the sea, Mantua, Verona, and Peschiera, with fortified bridges

towards Italy and Lombardy. The principal river is the Po, which waters the rich plain of Lombardy between the Alps and Apennines, and enters the Adriatic Sea by means of several channels. It is, for the most part, a turbid stream, in consequence of the immense quantity of sediment brought into its channel by the numerous tributaries which it receives on either side. The continual deposit of this sediment where its waters meet the sea causes an increase of the land, and the delta of the Po is thus constantly protruded by slow but sure steps further into the basin of the Adriatic. The Po is 450 miles long, and capable of navigation through almost its whole course, but is not much used for this purpose, owing to the danger caused by the frequent and sudden changes in the rapidity of its current when its numerous tributaries are swollen by the violent rains or melting of the mountain snows. The Po carries an immense quantity of mud, which, in fact, towards the lower part of the course has gradually raised the bed of the stream to a higher level than that of the adjacent country, which is obliged to be protected by embankments. Near Ferrara the surface of the river is 30 feet higher than the streets of the town.

The Adige, rising in the Rhætian Alps, and near Glurns takes the name of Etsch. It flows eastward to Bolsano from whence it takes the name of Adige, and receiving the Eisach becomes navigable; then flowing southward, and afterwards in

an easterly direction, it passes Trent and Verona, and after a course of about 250 miles, falls into the Gulf of Venice. The Mincio issues from the south extremity of the Lago di Garda, and flows south into the Po, 12 miles below that town, after a course of about 40 miles. In the neighbourhood of Mantua the waters stagnate, so as to form shallow lakes of considerable extent.

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CHAPTER III.

Movements of the Prussian Army which influenced the
Strategy of the Italian General.

WE will attempt to describe the movements of the Prussian Army on the two flanks of the opposing Austrian and Federal forces, which would lead to the points which the Italians intended attacking. We take Venice as the centre, Dalmatia and the Tyrol as the extremes of the flanks of these points. The reason why we have entered into detail with regard to the Prussian movements towards Munich, is to prove that Bavaria had sufficient time to assemble her entire forces, and that these movements greatly influenced the operations of the Austrian army in Italy, and the progress of the war in Bohemia. The Bavarians, by retreating before the Prussian forces, neutralized to a great extent any advantage gained by the Austrian army, either in an offensive or defensive war in Bohemia. Had the Prussians entered Munich, they could have advanced with their main body on Vienna, and detached a smaller force towards the Tyrol; or made a feint in the direction of Vienna, and then marched with their combined forces towards the Tyrol. Fearing the accomplishment of either of these two movements, the Austrians were compelled to assemble large bodies of troops at the approaches

of Vienna, and in the neighbourhood of the Lake of Garda, in order, at the latter place, to prevent any large body of Italian troops entering the Tyrol. This, no doubt, was the reason of the Archduke Albrecht taking the initiative, as he most likely had received official intelligence of Bavaria's vacillating policy, and he therefore, as a worthy descendant of the great Archduke Charles, knew too well the great advantages he would gain by taking the offensive and gaining the first victory, in order to be prepared to throw himself on any other Italian force advancing in a different direction. The reward which Bavaria would have received from the hands of Count Bismarck, had his troops entered Munich, would have been the honour of belonging to the new Prussian Fatherland. We will only draw the following conclusion. Had the government of Bavaria only behaved with the same patriotic spirit which actuated her common soldiers at Kissengen, she would not have been placed in the painful position of having the highest order she had it in her power to bestow, declined by her conqueror, the Prussian Prime Minister.

On the evening of the 16th of June the Prussians entered the Hessian territory—the Hessians retiring before them. On the 16th Saxony was entered by the Prussian force under General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and Dresden was occupied on the 18th; the Saxon troops having retired on the 15th followed by their king.

At the same time, Prince Frederick Charles advanced rapidly, and joined General Herwarth von Bittenfeld, and the whole of Saxony fell into the hands of the Prussians.

On 16th of June General Von Falkenstein marched into Hanover, entering the capital next day. Stade was next taken, the whole country overpowered, and the brave Hanoverian army, after a gallant struggle, compelled to surrender. Such were the events in the north. It is not our purpose to give a more detailed account; we will therefore return southward.

CHAPTER IV.

**Relative Position of the Austrian and Italian Armies on the
20th of June.**

ITALY on the 20th of June declared war against Austria. The Italians brought four corps d'armée against Austria; the 1st composed out of four divisions under the command of Giovanni Durando, showed front against the Lake of Garda and the Upper Mincio, with head-quarters at Lodi; the 2nd, with three divisions under command of Cuchiari, against Mantua and the Lower Mincio, with head-quarters at Cremona; the 3rd, under Della Rocca, with four divisions, and head-quarters at Piacenza, took up a position in rear of the 1st and 2nd army on both sides of the Po. The 4th, under Cialdini, with head-quarters at Bologna, with five divisions on the Lower Po and Lower Adige. These were opposed by Austria with three corps d'armée, the 5th, 7th, and 9th, under command of the Archduke Albrecht, who had formerly greatly distinguished himself at Novara. Two corps d'armée occupied strong positions on the Mincio and the Adige, and one occupied Eastern Venetia and Istria; the 3rd corps d'armée, with head-quarters at Laibach, under the command of Archduke Ernst, formed a reserve which could be employed towards Bohemia and Italy.

Italy's declaration of war against Austria dated

from Cremona, signed by General La Marmora, was addressed to the Archduke Albrecht, and stated that after the third day, hostilities would commence, but if Austria would prefer commencing hostilities sooner, she was to inform General La Marmora of her determination.

On the 16th June Prussia commenced her operations against Kur Hesse, Hanover and Saxony, and on the 21st against Austria. Italy commenced hostilities against Austria on the 23rd.

CHAPTER V.

Italian and Austrian accounts of the Battle of Custozza in 1848 and the Battle of Solferino in 1859, in order to facilitate a knowledge of the movements of the Armies in the Battle of Custozza, July 24th, 1866.

FROM THE ITALIAN CORRESPONDENT OF
THE TIMES.

THE King on learning the disaster of Rivoli advanced at once with 6000 men from Marmirolo, the ill chosen headquarters whence all his misfortunes date, giving order to the Duke of Savoy to follow with all the troops that could be collected. In this way a body of nearly 30,000 men was concentrated at Villa Franca on Tuesday, and on that night and following morning the whole advanced in good order burning to avenge the defeat of their comrades on the Mincio, against the line of hills extending from Custozza near Valeggio to the Adige. The principal attack was directed against Custozza, Somma Campagna, and Sona, where the Austrians were in force, well provided with artillery and a large body of Hussars, ready to profit by any occasion that might present itself. The attack was impetuous, and the resistance great, and for a moment all the positions were in the hands of the Piedmontese, but the Austrians were reinforced by drafts from their battalions on the Mincio, and the Piedmontese were driven back.

Undaunted by this reverse, the gallant troops of Charles Albert reformed at the foot of the heights and again advanced, carrying everything before them; but on the hills they were again met by increased forces, and the battle was for some time suspended. The troops had now fought from five in the morning till five in the evening. At this moment Radetzky, who seemed to have calculated every thing with the greatest precision, advanced from Verona with 20,000 men he had called in from Venice, Vicenza, Padua, and falling with these troops on the flank of the exhausted Sardinians, whilst he renewed his attack in front, Charles Albert was compelled to yield.

The beaten Piedmontese retired on Villa Franca and crossed the Mincio to Goito. Charles Albert's generalship had been decidedly wrong. He was to blame in leaving the important point, Rivoli, at the extreme of the left wing, in the occupation of a very small force. He was wrong in depriving the position touching on the Adige and running to Valeggio on the Mincio of all but 5000 men, and most unwise in collecting 40,000 men on the extreme right round Mantua, in such a manner as to be unable to assist each other or re-inforce any part of the line. Of all these blunders Radetzky took full advantage, occupying the King's attention at Governolo and Ostiglia, and evincing great skill in not following the King to Villa Franca and Goito, but in crossing the Mincio in the centre of

the line, winning the race to the heights of Volta, and thus turning the position of Goito, which had been strengthened with so much pains against an attack in front from Mantua.

RADETZY'S REPORT OF THE BATTLE OF
CUSTOZZA.

On the night of the 24th July, I was informed of the enemy's intention to attack, with 40,000 of his best troops, the position I had taken up from Custozza to Valeggio. I made my dispositions accordingly, and then stood waiting for the attack, which came off at 10 o'clock in the morning, in a tropical heat of more than 28 degrees of Réamur, in consequence of which large numbers of men perished on the march.

The battle raged without intermission till 7 in the evening. I shall call this battle, the Battle of Custozza, for that place formed the centre of our operations.

I never saw any army more persevering in any battle.

All the enemy's efforts to take my positions failed, while my brave troops, in spite of the heat and fatigues of the day, stormed the heights which were occupied by the royal troops, and forced them back upon Goito. We have gained a decisive victory, but I have lost many officers, they set a generous example of bravery to the troops.

As far as I can ascertain, my loss amounts to

from 5000 to 6000, including killed and wounded. We took a great booty, and a good number of prisoners. About 80,000 Austrians were engaged at Custozza.

DESCRIPTION OF THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO.

On the evening of June 23rd the whole Austrian army sallied out from Verona and Mantua, recrossed the Mincio and occupied the principal points of the hilly region from Pozzolengo on the N. E., by Solferino and Cavriana to Guidizzolo, in the plain of the Chiese, their line of battle being nearly 16 miles in length. The village of Solferino is perched on a high hill overlooking the plain, being its centre; the French, being posted from Lonato and Carpenedolo by Castiglione, and the Piedmontese, who formed the left wing of the Allied armies, from Desenzano to Rivoltella on the south shores of Lake Garda. On the 24th of June at 5 a.m., the French commenced the battle by attacking the left wing of the Austrians in the plain of Medole, and soon after the centre at Solferino; whilst the Piedmontese, commanded by their gallant King, engaged the enemy's right under Marshal Benedek, who successfully held his ground against them. Between Pozzolengo and S. Martino the battle, or rather the several independent actions, lasted with varying success until 4 p.m., although in favour of the Allies with hourly increasing advantage, when by a supreme effort the French succeeded in carrying Solferino, the

key of the position, and establishing themselves solidly on its heights, thus cutting the Austrian line in two. The result was a general retreat, which was effected with considerable order on the same evening, by recrossing the Mincio at Monzambano, Borghetto, and Goito, the Piedmontese at the same time following Benedek and obliging him to retire under the guns of Peschiera. The Austrian army is said to have amounted to 150,000 men, the allied French and Sardinian to a little more than that number. Both sides suffered severely.*

On the 23rd of June, 1866, the Italian army under the command of Victor Emanuel, consisting of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd corps d'armée, and the division of Cavalry of the line, had advanced to the extreme frontier of Italy. The composition of these forces was as follows: 1st corps, Durando, was formed out of the Cerale, Pianelli, Sirtori, and Brignone divisions; the 2nd corps, Cuchiari, was formed out of the divisions Angioletti, Longnoni, Cosenza and Nunziante; the 3rd, Della Rocca, was formed out of the divisions Cugia, Govone, Bixio, and Crown Prince Humbert.

According to the Italian military organization a division would contain 12,000 men: Infantry, Bersaglieri and Cavalry—with 18 guns. The twelve divisions would therefore consist of 144,000 men,

* The unaccountable retreat of a large part of the Austrian Cavalry no doubt greatly assisted the French.

and the whole army, including the Reserve Cavalry Division, would consist of about 146,000 men with 228 guns. The head-quarters of the 1st corps were at Cavriana, one of the positions occupied by the Austrian troops in the battle of Solferino; 2nd, Castellucchio, a few miles from Le Grazie—the former Austrian frontier town: 3rd, Gazzoldo Cavalry at Medole, and the principal head-quarters at Canneto on the Oglio, whence they were transferred on the nights of the 22nd and 23rd to Cerlungo (a few miles distant from the Mincio), the King himself going on to Goito.* The frontier was passed at 7 A.M. on the 23rd. Victor Emanuel is supposed to have received secret information, that the Austrians did not intend defending the ground between the Mincio and the Adige, but instead to concentrate their forces behind the latter river; he therefore determined to occupy this ground, cross the Adige and effect a junction with General Cialdini who had to cross the Lower Po. Under this supposition, and finding that the plain in front of Verona was unoccupied, Victor Emanuel determined to carry out the plan before-mentioned, viz., by marching with his army, to cut off the communications between Verona, Peschiera and Mantua; taking up a strong position between the plain of Villa Franca† and the

* The third bridge southwards of Peschiera over the Mincio, celebrated for the brilliant passage of Charles Albert in 1849.

† Villa Franca celebrated as the head-quarters of Charles

group of hills between Valeggio,* Somma Campagna† and Castelnuovo,‡ which would favour the successive development of the operations contemplated. The Mincio was crossed at five different points without resistance.

The division of Cavalry only found some weak patrols upon the numerous roads which radiate from the Mincio into the plain of Verona, and made a few prisoners.

Pianelli's division, belonging to the 1st corps, was to remain as a corps of observation at Peschiera on the right bank of the Mincio at Ponti.§ This was done, no doubt, with the intention of making the Austrians believe that the Italians intended investing Peschiera and to assist Garibaldi in his movements towards Tyrol. The division, Cosenza, a brigade of the division Nunziante, both belonging to the 2nd corps, were

Albert, in 1848, whence he attempted to blockade Radetzky in Verona, and also for the Peace between the Emperors of France and of Austria.

* Valeggio and Borghetto constitute an important military position, as affording an easy passage of the Mincio. Here the French crossed in August, 1796, after the battle of Castiglione, the Piedmontese in 1848, and the French again in 1859.

† Somma Campagna, a village about two miles on the left of Custoza, situated on a high position.

‡ Castelnuovo, half a mile above the station of the same name, celebrated for its partial destruction by the Austrians in 1848.

§ A small place communicating with a bridge over the Mincio and Monzambano, and a road toward Peschiera.

detached towards Mantua, partly on the line of the Ozone by Curtatone* and Montanara, partly farther south towards the Po. The other brigade of the division, Nunziante, took up positions on the right side of the Po to observe Borgoforte,† and to keep up the junction with Cialdini's army. The two divisions, Angioletti and Longnoni of the 2nd corps, were to remain for the present at Castelluccio, to proceed on the 24th over the Mincio at Goito, and to co-operate with those troops which were posted between the Mincio and the Adige. On the morning of the 23rd the division, Cerale, advanced over the Mincio towards Monzambano.‡ The division, Sirtori, at Borghetto and Valeggio. The division, Brignone, at Molini di Volta,§ between Volta|| and Pozzolo.¶ At Goito the Reserve Cavalry division passed over first, and the four divisions of the 3rd corps d'armée followed in succession. The two divisions, Bixio and Crown Prince Hum-

* Curtatone on the Lago Superiore, formed by the widening of the Mincio. Here was fought on the 29th May, 1848, a severe fight between the Tuscan Revolutionary Volunteers and the Austrian troops.

† Celebrated for its position as regards the road leading from Governolo to Ostiglia and Revere.

‡ On the left bank of the Mincio. A very hilly road proceeds to Pozzolengo and San Martino, known for the resistance of the Piedmontese, the first bridge after Peschiera.

§ The next bridge over the Mincio above Goito. It connects Volta with Pozzolo and Villa Franca.

|| Connected with Borghetto and Molini di Volta.

¶ Pozzolo, connected with Volta and Valeggio.

bert, were pushed forward to Belvedere* and Roverbella;† the divisions Govone and Cugia encamped at Pozzolo and Massimbona;‡ the three divisions of the 1st corps d'armée bivouacked on the left bank of the Mincio.

The writer, in order that the reader should more fully understand the movements of the two opposing armies, begs leave to draw attention to the fact that Radetzky, the pupil of the great Archduke Charles, encountered Carlo Alberto on the 25th of July, 1848, on the rise of the heights on the line of Valeggio, Custozza, Somma Campagna,§ Sona and Santa, in the direction of Verona and the Adige Valley.

It was naturally supposed by the public of Europe that the Archduke Albrecht, together with Admiral Tegethoff, would only play a very inferior part in this eventful war, and that the Archduke would never prove that he understood his father's writings, or benefited by the instructions of Radetzky, solely because, like most good soldiers, he preferred that the world should judge his merits. His army being small in numbers, and totally in-

* Belvedere, connected with Villa Franca.

† Roverbella, to the right of the station of the same name, was the head-quarters of Napoleon, 1796, during the operations between the Adige and the Mincio.

‡ Massimbona on the route to Villa Franca.

§ To the north of Somma Campagna with which it is connected, also Verona and Bussolengo.

adequate to make any aggressive movement, it was supposed he would only fight if compelled to do so : and even then in the neighbourhood of one of the fortresses which could receive his army if defeated. He was, moreover, considered to be surrounded on three sides, it being then thought Italy ruled the Adriatic Sea. He would, therefore, naturally await the enemy in such a position as above named, but, as the writer has before said, if a general can depend on his army, and has in his possession different lines of communication well connected, and several armies advancing from different directions, the offensive movement is most advantageous. The Italians relying upon the information, together with their supposed superiority, viz : from being able to attack the Archduke on so many different points, and thereby divert his attention from the real point of attack, took up a triangular position separating the forts Valeggio, Castelnuovo, and Somma Campagna. On the 24th of June the 1st corps of the Italian army was ordered to leave the division Pianelli on the right bank of the Mincio, and to remove headquarters to Castelnuovo. The division Cerale was to push forward to the same place and make front towards Peschiera. The division Sirtori and Brignone were to advance to S. Giustina* and Sona to show front against Pastrengo and Verona. This line was intended to be formed in a southerly

* One of the routes to Verona.

direction* to Somma Campagna and Villa Franca by the 3rd corps d'armée, and farther still to Quaderni* and Mozzecane,† by the reserve Cavalry. The two divisions, Angioletti and Longnoni, belonging to the 2nd corps, were to cross the Mincio on the 24th, and to take position as a reserve corps at Marmiolo and Roverbella. A new bridge was to be erected at Torre di Goito, to be protected by tête-dé-ponts on the left bank of the Mincio.

The Italian troops marched forward to occupy these positions between the Mincio and the Adige, Verona and Peschiera, under the supposition that no fighting would take place. There is no doubt the troops that made these movements were not properly rationed during the latter part of their march, but their supplies would have come up in proper time had not the Austrians suddenly come in contact with them. To use an Italian General's own words, the forward march which it seemed must lead to a simple occupation of positions, was changed soon after its commencement into a serious combat on all the front lines of our columns, so that our heads of columns, marching in an inverse sense, found themselves everywhere, and almost simultaneously, arrested in the plain and on the hills by an energetic resistance, soon converted into an offensive movement.

* Nearly in the centre of the three lines running from Valeggio, Massimbona, and Villa Franca.

† All round this neighbourhood are the marshy districts of Mantua.

PREPARATIONS ON THE PART OF AUSTRIA
BEFORE THE BATTLE OF CUSTOZZA.

Archduke Albrecht, the Commander-in-chief of the Austrian army in Venetia, had under his command the following corps. The 5th, commanded by Prince Frederic Lichenstein; the 7th, commanded by F. M. L. Maroichich at Madonna del Monte; the 9th, under the command of F. M. L. Hartung, and a reserve infantry division commanded by General Major Radich—afterwards succeeded by General Ruprecht.

At the time of the Prussians' march into Schleswig Holstein, the greater part of the troops just mentioned were concentrated between Pastrengo * and S. Bonifacio round Verona, so as to form with the utmost facility a combined front of battle on either bank of the Adige. At the time of Italy's declaration of war, the reserve infantry division was posted at Pastrengo on the right wing; the 5th and 9th corps were concentrated at Verona; several light brigades were pushed forward against the Lower Po, to observe Cialdini; and Colonel Pulz' light brigade of cavalry towards the Mincio, with instructions not to lose sight of the army under the command of Victor Emanuel, and should he attempt to pass over the Mincio, to fall back gradually over Villa Franca,

* A strong strategical position on the right bank of the Adige, celebrated in most of the Italian Wars.

and to avoid any serious conflict. Pulz had already retired on the 22nd of June when the Italians made their first preparations for a passage over the Mincio toward Villa Franca. After completing their passage over the Mincio on the 23rd of June, the reserve cavalry division advanced against Villa Franca, and the Austrian cavalry retired farther back and arrived on the evening of the 23rd at Fort Giseln, in front of Verona. At two o'clock on the afternoon of the 23rd of June, the Archduke Albrecht received the important information from Colonel Reuber of the Staff, who had been sent by him to Somma Campagna, to the effect that this place and the heights to the south of Custozza were up to that time not occupied by the Italians, but large clouds of dust were easily discernible south of Somma Campagna, which evidently showed their line of march. It was supposed at head-quarters that King Victor Emanuel after crossing the Mincio would reach Villa Franca and Isola della Scala* by rapid marches, throw a bridge over the Adige, and so form a junction with Cialdini. The Archduke, therefore, resolved at once to throw himself suddenly on the left wing of the Italians in their march towards the Adige, and if possible to occupy at once the heights of Somma Campagna, Sona, and S. Giustina, and then to push on to Valeggio,

* At the junction of lines from Verona, Villa Franca, and several other places.

Monzambano, and Peschiera. There was sufficient time to effect this, the distance between Goito and Albaredo being six miles and perhaps more, the Italians could not reach Albaredo before the evening of the 24th, if the calculation of the Austrians was right; they had besides to throw a bridge over the Adige, their passage, therefore, could hardly be effected before the morning of the 25th of June. There was, consequently, sufficient time left for the Archduke Albrecht to occupy the heights at Sona and Somma Campagna. The distance from here to Villa Franca is hardly more than a mile, and strong bodies of Austrian troops could therefore attack Villa Franca in the morning.

The reserves stationed at S. Lucia* might advance in front of Verona, and also at Castel d'Azzano,† and these by suddenly throwing themselves on the heads of the advancing columns of the Italians would cause a stoppage in their advance, and afford time to the Archduke Albrecht to put himself in order of battle. On the afternoon of the 23rd of June the Archduke ordered at once the brigade of Col. Prince Saxe Weimar, belonging to the reserve division, to advance from Pastrengo to Sandra,‡ to take up positions here and send detachments against Castelnuovo.

* The junction of several routes leading to Verona.

† On line of communication with Verona.

‡ Sandra — between Pastrengo and Castelnuovo.

The 5th corps d'armée under General Radich was to advance from Verona to Sona and to send detachments from here towards Zerbare,* in the direction of Custozza and Valeggio. The 9th corps d'armée under F. M. L. Hartung was concentrated in the neighbourhood of S. Lucia in front of Verona. The 7th corps d'armée under F. M. L. Maroichich, at Madonna del Monte, received orders to advance by forced marches in front of Verona in the vicinity of S. Massimo.† The cavalry attached to the several corps d'armée was divided into two brigades, one under the command of Col. Pulz, and the other under the command of Col. Bujanovics, commanding the 11th Regiment of Hussars. On the evening of the 23rd of June the Archduke Albrecht, having no doubt received reliable and distinct information as to the direction in which the Italian columns intended marching, pushed his head-quarters to S. Massimo, and on the following morning gave orders that the troops should at once occupy the following positions, Sandra, S. Giustina, Sona, and Somma Campagna, and when in these positions should make a movement to the left which would bring the troops on the line of Castelnovo, San Giorgio,‡ Zerbare, Somma Campagna,

* Zerbare—on the heights near Somma Campagna.

† S. Massimo—a village a few miles distant from Verona.

‡ San Giorgio—on the line of railway communicating with Verona.

and Berettara,* from whence the several corps, divisions and brigades were to push forward to the south. The two cavalry brigades under Pulz and Bujanovics had to advance by way of Ganfardine† and Dossobuono‡ to Custozza§ and Villa Franca towards their left, and there cover the movements of the left wing of the army. By these dispositions the Austrians would be able to attack the advancing Italian army with the greatest advantage. The number of men occupying these positions was estimated at 75,000 Austrians, and 272 guns. On the 23rd of June the Italians, as we have before said, crossed over to the left bank of the Mincio. The divisions Angioletti and Longnoni had orders to cross the Mincio on the 24th of June. The supposed number of men engaged on both sides were, 75,000 Austrians, with 272 guns; and 90,000 Italians with 192 guns.

* Berettara—on the heights south of Campagna.

† Ganfardine—communicating with Villa Franca and Somma Campagna.

‡ Dossobuono—on the line of railway from Verona to Villa Franca.

§ Celebrated for the battle between Radetzky and Charles Albert.

CHAPTER VI.

Description of the Battle of Custozza, June 24th, 1866.

DURING the night of the 23rd, as both armies were advancing, a considerable quantity of rain fell, which much embarrassed both the Austrian and Italian armies, but it had the good effect of clearing the atmosphere to a great extent, and diminishing the dust, which only those who have served in this neighbourhood can appreciate. Before sunrise on the 24th, the Austrian 9th corps d'armée received orders to march from S. Lucia to Somma Campagna; the 3rd corps d'armée followed, leaving a detachment at Sona, in the direction of S. Giorgio. The Reserve division, stationed at Sandra, marched towards Castelnovo, the outposts of these different bodies were simultaneously pushed forward, and the two brigades of cavalry deployed to the left of the 9th corps d'armée in the plain. These troops came first of all into contact, on the morning of the 24th of June, with the Reserve Cavalry division, which was marching from Villa Franca to Dossobuono and Ganfardine, and afterwards with Bixio's division, which was following the former division on the left. On Pulz's arriving in the neighbourhood of Villa Franca, he came in contact with the enemy's

infantry, and received orders not to attempt any decisive movement until the fight on the heights had been decided. Active skirmishing was kept up on both sides the greater part of the day, without any decided result; later in the day the division Cugia, advancing to Montatore* and Staffalo,† came in contact with the Austrian corps Hartung, at about eight o'clock in the morning. About this time the Reserve division of the Austrian forces came in contact with the vanguard of the corps Durando, and forced the Italians to retire, who then took up their position at Oliosì,‡ and awaited the further attack of the Austrians. The commander of the 8th corps, General Radich, thereupon ordered the brigade Piret to cross the Oliosì, whilst the remaining brigades were to advance against S. Rocco di Palazzuolo. General Scudier, of the vanguard of the 7th corps, marching by way of Sona to Zerbare, was to effect a junction between the fifth and ninth corps.

The well-directed fire of the Austrian artillery soon set the buildings of Oliosì in flames, although they had to contend against heavier pieces and nearly double the number of guns. General Cerale, after a desperate struggle, was compelled to retire with severe loss, he being himself wounded; the

* Montatore—on the heights of Somma Campagna.

† Staffalo—a small place to the north of Montatore, and the junction of several routes.

‡ On a rise near the Tione.

Austrian Reserve division and the brigade Piret following closely in the direction of Monte Vento. At about one o'clock, from the slowness of the advance of the Italian supports, it must have been evident to the Archduke Albrecht that there was every chance of gaining a victory, and, in fact, the division Sirtori advanced so slowly from Valeggio to S. Lucia, on the Tione, that it only arrived just in time to support the left flank of Cerale's division, which had suffered most heavily.

Most unfortunately for the Italians, Durando, one of Italy's ablest generals, was wounded in attempting to re-form Cerale's division at Monte Vento, which obliged him to leave the front. At about two o'clock Monte Vento was taken by the Reserve division and the brigade Piret. The division Cerale had to retreat in the direction of Valeggio. Here Cerale was reinforced by the Reserve of the 1st corps d'armée, consisting of four battalions of Bersaglieri, four batteries and the Cavalry brigade. After the evacuation of Monte Vento by the Italians, the brigades Bauer and Mosenz, belonging to the 5th Austrian corps, advanced to S. Rocco di Palazzuolo against Sirtori's division at S. Lucia. Sirtori, after evacuating S. Lucia, commenced his retreat toward Valeggio, by way of Monte Mammar.

The remnant of Cerale's division were enabled to effect their retreat with little loss, owing to the great heat, that prevented Piret's brigade, which

had been constantly engaged during the day, from following and reaping all the advantages. There is no doubt that the greater part of the Italians would have been taken prisoners had they been pursued. The Reserve division marched in the direction of Salionze* and Monzambano in order to out-manceuvre Pianelli. At three o'clock one may fairly consider that the Italian left flank had been totally defeated. In the other parts of the battle-field, on the heights, on the east side of the Tione; desperate fighting was still going on. The 9th corps d'armée remained stationary at Somma Campagna up to about eight o'clock, when the division Cugia advancing by way of Madonna del Croce† and Montatore against Staffalo, F. M. L. Hartung ordered the occupation of Casa del Sole‡ and Berettara, which was principally defended by artillery. Shortly afterward he was ordered to advance in the direction of Custozza, which movement he was for some time unable to accomplish on account of the steady resistance offered by Cugia's division, which was supported on its right by the Crown Prince Humbert division. About this time Brignone's division pushed forward between Cugia and Sirtori. It was composed of two brigades—Sardinian Grenadiers, under the

* Salionze—near the left bank of the Mincio, and on the road to Castelnuovo.

† Madonna del Croce—on the heights near Custozza.

‡ Casa del Sole—on the heights south of Villa Franca.

command of General Gozzoni di Treville, and the Lombardy Grenadiers, under the command of Prince Amadeus. This division was originally intended to act as a reserve to the 2nd corps d'armée, which came into engagement after passing the Mincio.

On the morning of the 24th of June this body of troops left Molini della Volta and went to Valeggio, and from there was ordered to cross the Tione and march towards Custozza. At Custozza, La Marmora took the command, and led this splendid body of men into action, and on its arrival at Monte Godio the brigade Scudier attacked the Grenadiers with such impetuosity that although the Grenadiers fought with the greatest determination and had both of their Brigadiers wounded, they were at last forced to retreat in the direction of Custozza. The division Govone was ordered to advance and cover this movement. After the loss of Monte Vento by Cerales's division, and the evacuation of S. Lucia by Sirtori's division, the retreating Italians did not make another stand against their victorious enemies until they reached the neighbourhood of Monte Godio, Staffalo, and Custozza. The successful 7th Austrian corps continued its rapid advance, supported by the heavy batteries posted at Casa del Sole, belonging to the 9th corps, which had directed its fire against La Bagolina,* and forced the division Govone to retire from here. Cugia, finding his

* La Bagolina—on heights near Custozza.

left wing out-flanked, was compelled to evacuate the heights of Montatore and Madonna del Croce, and at five o'clock in the afternoon the entire army of the Italians was in full retreat. At about seven o'clock the Austrians occupied Custozza. The retreat of the Italian army was covered in the plain between Villa Franca and Custozza by the reserve Cavalry division. The Cavalry brigade of the 3rd corps d'armée came here into action, together with the division Bixio, and several detachments of the 2nd corps d'armée.

The two divisions Angioletti and Longnoni, belonging to this corps d'armée, had been ordered to march on the 24th of June from the neighbourhood of Castellucchio by way of Goito over the Mincio to Villa Franca, and not having had to perform on the previous day any fatiguing marches they ought easily to have been able, after crossing the Mincio at about eight o'clock in the morning, to arrive at Villa Franca during the early part of the afternoon. The writer is of the same opinion which is attributed to General La Marmora, that the fight was settled at a very early period of the day, about the time he led Brignone's division into action. Although the Italians fought with the utmost bravery and steadiness, yet a certain lack of tenacity and leadership was visible in all their movements, which the writer considers can be attributed to the mixing of the Piedmontese army with that of the newly incorporated States of Italy, and,

in fact, the battle was nothing but a judiciously designed snare, based upon the principle of the well-known dash of Southern troops, that is to say, a surprise ending in defeat. The Italians by a rapid march intended seizing the heights and surprising the Austrians, but were, in fact, themselves surprised. La Marmora induced Victor Emanuel, who had been watching the battle from the neighbourhood between Villa Franca and Custozza, to march to Valeggio, and there to cross over to the right bank of the Mincio. La Marmora himself went to Goito to bring the two divisions, Angioletti and Longnoni, a proceeding quite incomprehensible. It appears that no special orders were given from headquarters as to how the different corps had to retreat, but the Generals of divisions managed to bring them out of action in tolerably good order. The public has attached some blame to Sirtori. The remainder behaved remarkably well. Generals Cerale and Cugia distinguished themselves greatly. The division Pianelli, of the 1st corps d'armée, retired towards Monzambano, the Cerale and Sirtori divisions towards Valeggio, and the Brignone division toward Molini della Volta, the divisions Cugia and Govone, of the 3rd corps d'armée, towards Valeggio, Crown Prince Humbert and Bixio toward Goito. The left side of the Mincio had already been evacuated during the afternoon of the 24th by 1st and 3rd corps d'armée, with the *Reservé* Cavalry during the night of the 25th to 26th,

and concentrated on the one side at Volta, on the other side between Goito and Cerlungo. The bridge of Valeggio was burnt down. The losses on both sides were very considerable. According to the Austrian official lists, which never appear quite complete, their loss, as then reported, was 960 dead, and 3690 wounded; in addition to this number we may count from 900 to 1000 missing or prisoners, and this would give a total of about 5500 in all, according to our calculation.

The 5th corps d'armée had 212 dead and 904 wounded; the 9th, 313 dead and 1163 wounded; the 7th corps, 259 dead with 816 wounded. The disposable part of the Reserve division, which originally came in hot contact with the Cerale division, lost 164 dead and 741 wounded; the Reserve Cavalry lost 4 dead and 47 wounded; and the rest we find were lost during a sortie which the garrison of Peschiera made against the division Pianelli. The loss of officers was very severe on the Austrian side. The Italians lost on the 24th of June 720 dead, among them 69 officers; 3112 wounded, among them 203 officers; and missing of all descriptions were 4315 men, among whom were 63 officers. The total loss of the Italian Army amounted to 8447 men. According to Italian statements 7712, with several guns.*

It is reported that had the Governor of Mantua,

* These lists we believe not to be correct, and the losses on both sides were far heavier than was reported.

General Stankovics, obeyed the order to attack the retreating Italians with every disposable man, the victory of Custozza would have been of such a decisive character as would have enabled the Archduke Albrecht to follow up his victory and inflict another defeat; but unfortunately he only sent a few battalions in the direction of Curtatone. We think that not much credit can be attached to this report. As the Governor of Mantua had two duties to perform, first, to defend the fortress; and, secondly, to prevent a revolt in the town; and as his garrison was barely sufficient to defend Mantua we can hardly conceive it to be possible that he could have spared a large number of men. Political reasons, no doubt, prevented the Austrians following up their success.

CHAPTER VII.

Supposed cause of the Italian defeat at Custozza, and the reason why La Marmora did not again attack the Austrians.

THERE can be no possible reason for the Italians not having again renewed the combat, if their own statements are correct—as regards the state of their troops on the 26th and 27th. The history of former times affords us brilliant examples of armies who have suffered defeat, and in a few days again renewed the combat. But it must be owned that Victor Emanuel would have had to play a desperate game if he had met with a second repulse.

One of the reported causes of the defeat of the Italian army on the 24th is to be attributed to the fact that, at the outbreak of the War, the Military train was not found sufficiently numerous for the wants of the army in its advance. To supply this deficiency, a great number of civilian drivers had been engaged. Unfortunately a large number of these men had advanced with their carts too far, and got into the line of fire of the Austrian Artillery; naturally the men were seized with a sudden panic, and in their vain attempts to get out of danger blocked up the road with their carts, and to save their lives cut the traces

and rode away. This, no doubt, caused a certain degree of confusion, and most likely, if their numbers were large, must have greatly retarded the advance of supports who were marching in this direction.

As before said, had Victor Emanuel been defeated a second time he would have had to play a desperate game; we doubt not that the spirit of the Italian troops was good and that they wished to be led on again, but it must have been apparent to La Marmora that there had been a certain want of unity among the troops on the 24th, and as some of the most experienced Generals had been wounded it was but too natural to suppose that the soldiers would not have such confidence in new and untried leaders.* Supposing that these troops had again been led across the river, can one for a moment think that the Archduke Albrecht, knowing so well as he did the terrain on which he was operating, and having so many secure places of retreat on either flank and in his rear, would act on the offensive unless he was nearly certain of gaining a victory, and if when acting on the defensive he was compelled to fight, would not choose such a position that if the Italians were successful the victory would be of no use to them.

* Italian prisoners stated that they had been marching several days prior to the battle and had little or no rest, and hardly anything to eat.

CHAPTER VIII.

Description of the movements of the Italian Army under Victor Emanuel and Cialdini.

AFTER the battle of Custozza the Italian troops occupied Volta, Goito, and Solferino.* They then retreated in the direction of Cremona, and about the 28th the Italian army was concentrated between Cremona and Piacenza—Garibaldi protecting their flank in this march. This movement is said to have been made in order to cover Lombardy, and to effect a junction with Cialdini who had abandoned his positions on the Po, and was falling back on Bologna in order to effect a junction with the king's army near the Upper Po. The question which the reader must naturally ask is—why Victor Emanuel should have placed the Oglio between himself and the Austrians, if his army was in such a thorough state of organization as the Italians describe it to have been after the day of Custozza? If such was the case, we believe that this movement could only have been carried out in order to entice the Archduke Albrecht from his stronghold, and thereby enable Garibaldi and Cialdini to operate on his lines of communi-

* It was supposed that here they intended entrenching themselves, and awaiting the further attack of the Austrians.

cation; or, as the writer believes, it was not thought prudent to risk another battle immediately after their defeat. Shortly afterwards, the Italian army under the King was nearly broken up, the greater part of it being sent to reinforce Cialdini, in his operations on the Po.

Although the Austrians had only an inferior force to oppose Cialdini, yet when we consider the natural strength of the Austrian positions, we are led to believe that if the Imperialists had really intended opposing the advance of the Italians, they would never have got much farther than the left bank of the Po.

Cialdini concentrated on the 5th of July a considerable mass of artillery against the works of Borgoforte, to draw the attention of the Austrians to these positions, no doubt in order to deceive them as to his real intentions, and opened a heavy fire against these works.

After several hours he ceased firing, and gave orders to General Nunziante commanding the 4th division, to proceed with the siege of Borgoforte, and sent his other divisions farther down the Po. Originally, Cialdini had nine divisions at his command; at a later period, when the Venetian expeditionary corps was formed under the command of Cialdini, it consisted of fourteen divisions, and was formed into five corps d'armée of the line, each corps consisting of three divisions, commanded by the Generals Cadorna, Pianelli, Brignone, and Pettitta; a reserve

corps d'armée, composed chiefly of the two grenadier divisions and the cavalry under the command of Moritz-Sonnaz. On the 7th of July Cialdini concentrated his army (at this time only seven divisions, because the augmentation was only effected during the third week in July), in front of the Ponte Lagoscuro, with the exception of the division Franzini, posted at Ferrara,* and the division Nunziante posted at Suzzara,† in front of Borgoforte, behind Carbonara ‡ and Felonica. The head-quarters were at Roverbella; here, as well as at Pilastrì and S. Martino § and Spino, the artillery was concentrated. On the evening of the 7th of July, several detachments of Bersaglieri crossed over to the left side of the Po, and during the night following the 8th of July, three long pontoons were constructed over the Po. Each of these had a length of about 1000 feet. The left wing was to cross over at Carbonara, the centre at Sermide,|| and the right wing at Felonica. At

* Ferrara is situated in a fertile but unhealthy plain at a level of $6\frac{1}{2}$ feet above the sea, and at a short distance from the Po, which formerly formed the boundary between Austro-Venetian and North Italian Kingdoms. This plain, intersected only by irrigation canals from the river, presents an unbroken horizon, and extends with little variation up to the walls of Ferrara.

† Suzzara—near the Po, and connected with Modena.

‡ Carbonara—on the Bachiglione.

§ S. Martino—on the Bormida, a tributary of the Po.

|| Sermide—on the Po.

7 o'clock in the morning of the 8th of July the pontoons were finished, and the troops were at once ordered to cross over.

The whole distance during the passage of the Italians was covered by the marshes of the Vall Grandi Veronesi, equally preventing a resistance of the Austrians and a direct forward movement of the Italians. But, for the present, Cialdini's sole object was under cover of those marshes to gain possession of the left side of the Po, and by a flank movement with the greater part of his army to seize the main line of communication from Ferrara to Rovigo and Padua. As soon as this flank movement had been executed, pontoons between Ponte Lagoscuro and Santa Maria Maddalena, were at the same time to be thrown across the Po. During the night of the 9th to the 10th of July the Austrians blew up the Rovigo works and the Boara Railway bridge over the Adige. The following day Cialdini removed his headquarters to Rovigo.* On the 4th of July, after the passage of the Adige was effected, he occupied Padua without resistance. We have mentioned before that at the time when Cialdini commenced his advance over the Po, he gave to General Nunziante, Duke of Mignano, orders to carry on the siege of Borgoforte. Nunziante had then 74 guns at his disposal, the greater part of which were of heavy calibre. On the 6th of July his advanced

* In front of the fortification of the same name.

guard was at Zara, to the south of Borgoforte, awaiting the promised reinforcements of engineers and artillery. By the 9th of July, the day on which the regular siege of Borgoforte commenced, he had received the necessary number of engineers and artillery. Early on the morning of the 10th of July, Nunziante lodged a strong detachment of troops on the north side of the Zara Channel against the fort Monteggiana, the real tête-de-pont of Borgoforte. Under cover of this detachment he commenced to build on both quays of the Zara Channel eight batteries, directed partly against the tête-de-pont of the fort Monteggiana on the right side of the Po, and partly against the two forts—Rocchetta and Bocca di Ganda on the left side. Not until the night following, the 16th of July, were the Italian batteries completely armed, and at sunrise of the 17th of July they opened a heavy fire. At 11 o'clock the fort Monteggiana was completely silenced. Towards the evening the forts Rocchetta and Bocca di Ganda were likewise silenced, and the Austrian garrison at Borgoforte evacuated their position during the night of the 18th, retiring toward Mantua. This movement is said to have been executed in accordance with certain orders received by the Governor of Mantua. The Italians occupied Borgoforte, where, in addition to a considerable quantity of ammunition, 70 guns fell into their hands. Those divisions which were not

occupied in front of Borgoforte or at Ferrara were concentrated in the neighbourhood of Padua.*

When Cialdini commenced his advance, none of his newly gazetted corps commanders were at their posts, with the exception of Cadorna, and as time was of the highest importance to him he did not wait, but pushed on in order to occupy as much of the Venetian territory as possible, as at that time it was generally supposed that the Italian government would yield to the French demands. This supposition was, no doubt, strengthened by the way in which Prince Napoleon was received by Victor Emanuel and Baron Ricasoli at Ferrara, and in fact it was well known that the Imperialists did not intend acting on the offensive, but would only fight if attacked on their own frontier.

* A large military station of the Austrian troops.

CHAPTER IX.

Description of the movements of the Austrian Army after the battle of Custozza, together with the final movements of Cialdini's Army up to the date of the Armistice.

On the night of the 24th of June, the Archduke Albrecht was at Zerbare, in the neighbourhood of Somma Campagna, and kept up a constant reconnoitring towards the Italians. On the 26th he was near Verona, and on the 28th his head-quarters were again in the neighbourhood of Somma Campagna.

On the 1st of July he was at Peschiera.

About the same time a strong body of Austrian cavalry made a reconnaissance from Goito towards the Chiese, where they encountered the Italian outposts, drove them back, and took several prisoners. On July 2nd, the head-quarters were at Pozzolenigo, and on the 3rd at Cola, which is between Peschiera and Lazise, and three miles from the former place. The Austrians constructed bridges of boats at Goito and Monzambano, which they protected by earthworks.

Strong bodies of Austrian troops were concentrated before Peschiera and in the neighbourhood. On the 4th the Imperial troops had nearly completed their evacuation of the right bank of the

Mincio ; and at the same time a force amounting to about 20,000 men left Pozzolengo for Verona.

On the 5th, a force of two squadrons of Chasseurs, made a reconnaissance towards the Italians, and on retiring blew up the bridge at Goito.

The Archduke Albrecht seemed at this time to be placing all the positions in his rear in a state of defence, especially Rovigo. In order to let the enemy suppose that he intended here making a stand, and gradually to evacuate Venetia, and only leaving the necessary garrisons in the fortresses, and a sufficient number of troops to patrol the country, which would always give him the command of Venetia, so that he could easily re-enter and act on the offensive.

On the 6th the Archduke was at Verona ; at the same time the Austrian troops withdrew from their defences on the heights of Solferino and quietly recrossed the Mincio.

On the 8th head-quarters were at Caldiero. This and the adjoining heights of Colognola are celebrated in Austrian Military History as being the field on which Napoleon in the year 1796 received a most decided defeat. This was counterbalanced by his brilliant victory at Arcole, which he accomplished by retreating to Verona, then rapidly advancing along the right bank of the Adige, and crossing that river at Ronco.

On the 9th the Archduke Albrecht was at Vicenza, celebrated for its desperate resistance to

the Austrians in 1848, where the brave Thun Taxis fell. On the 10th, Austrian head-quarters were at Galliera, a village on the right of the Reno, and not far distant from the railway station Poggio Renatico. On the 11th the Archduke, with a few of his staff, left for Vienna. The Austrians evacuated the whole territory between the Mincio and the Adige; a large number of troops being stationed at Padua. Less important concentrations were made at Bardolina, Caprine, and Monte Baldo. Very few Austrian troops remained at Peschiera and Verona. About this time they destroyed the fortifications of Rovigo, and the entire Austrian force which was encamped before Verona re-entered that place.

The same movement was carried out by the remaining Austrian forces that were encamped in the neighbourhood of the different fortresses; but patrols were constantly moving in all directions, and had advanced as far as Villa Franca, Marmero, and the south of the Mestre Railway. The Imperialists evacuated the Livenza, and continued burning all the bridges in their line of retreat which could be of any use to the enemy. After the evacuation of Rovigo it was supposed that they intended to dispute the passage of the Adige. On the 12th the head-quarters of the army was near Montebelluno. East of this town the Ardo flows through a deep ravine into the Piave, so that it is flanked on two sides by a precipitous hill.

We think it desirable to give a slight description of this part of the country in order that the reader may more fully understand the movements of the advancing and retreating armies. Three miles from Belluno at Capo di Ponte the Piave is crossed by a fine wooden bridge of one arch, where the road joins the highway from the Ampezzo Pass, by which one can descend into the plains of Italy by the Lago di Santa Croce, Ceneda, Conegliano, and Treviso.

The Austrians simultaneously commenced retiring on all sides toward the frontiers of Austria, and some regiments were already in Vienna. On the 13th they were at Conegliano, on the high road which communicates with Belluno, the valley of Cadore, and Innspruck, and is of considerable strategical importance. Constant reconnoitring parties were kept up on both sides. We draw the attention of the reader to these lines of communication, with reference to the Archduke's second advance against Venetia.

On the 20th of July the Imperial troops evacuated Udine and the fortress Osoppo.

Palmanuova was then being put in a state of defence; 25,000 Austrians being stationed between Gratz and Laibach.

A part of the Austrian forces were about this time busily engaged in fortifying Mestre and all the roads leading to Padua and Treviso, which they afterwards evacuated. The commander of Verona

gave orders for the inhabitants to provide themselves with provisions for three months. The Austrians evacuated Bellimo and Feltre, and afterwards destroyed the bridges and cut up the roads at Bellimo and Val di Brenta in order to interrupt the communication with Cadore. On the 22nd one of the patrols coming from Legnano fell into an ambuscade prepared by some Italian rifles. On July 24th an armistice was concluded between the Austrian and Italian armies for eight days. Heads of columns halted at four o'clock. Troops were allowed to move in any direction, but not to advance beyond the heads of columns.

Immediately after the cession of Venetia to the Emperor of France, the Archduke Albrecht was summoned to Vienna to take the command of the Bohemian army. At the same time the greater part of the Austrian forces left Italy, including the 5th and 9th Corps, leaving only the garrison troops and the corps of the F. M. L. Maroichich in Venetia.

This we consider as the conclusion of the movements of the Austrian troops on Italian soil.

CHAPTER X.

Cession of Venetia to France by Austria, and the diplomatic reasons which led to it.

As Austria was one of the contracting powers at the Peace of Vienna, in which the Kingdom of Venetia had been guaranteed to her by the French representative, and as she had received this kingdom from the 1st Napoleon, according to the strict idea of legitimate diplomacy, she was bound in honour, in case of her wishing to give up this country, either to restore it to France, or consult her as to her wishes on the subject. As the writer believes, nothing was mentioned in either of those treaties that Austria was bound either to consult the people of Venetia as to their future fate, or the people of the remaining part of the Italian Peninsula, as to what was to become of Venetia in case of her wishing to surrender it, or any of the other powers that signed the treaty of Vienna; besides the Emperor of the French must be considered as the founder and faithful ally of Italy, and in that capacity he represented her at the Peace of Villa Franca, therefore Austria considered she was bound in honour to treat first with France as to the fate of Venetia before entering into any arrangement with the Italian government, and she naturally thought by so doing that France would do her utmost to prevent the Italians attacking Istria, Dalmatia, and the Tyrol. No doubt the Italian government had a difficult and very delicate game to play, for they had to keep on good terms with the

Emperor of the French, and the King of Prussia, also to satisfy the wounded pride of their own people, who unfortunately suspected that the Emperor of the French, would require some compensation for surrendering Venetia to them, either in the shape of their giving up the Prussian Alliance, or a part of the Italian territory. They therefore demanded that the government should treat personally with the Emperor of Austria, and they considered that the maintenance of the Prussian Alliance would naturally enable them to demand more favourable terms from the Court of Vienna, at the same time that the dignity of the nation would not be diminished.

After the battle of the 24th, the Italians, who for some unaccountable reasons seemed to have lost all confidence in General La Marmora, had conceived the idea that Garibaldi, with his supposed 40,000 volunteers, and Cialdini with his army, assisted by Persano's fleet, were to retrieve all former disasters. Garibaldi and Persano had the most difficult work to do, the one to obtain the Southern Tyrol, and the other the province of Istria or Dalmatia. The writer will attempt to describe how these unfortunate ideas were completely falsified. The Austrians retiring, after the cession of Venetia to France, on the one side to the Tyrol and on the other towards the Isonzo, were contented in destroying only those places which would facilitate the advance of the enemy. In the Tyrol and on the Isonzo the Italians knew that they had to expect a desperate resistance.

CHAPTER XI.

Geographical and Strategical Description of the Tyrol.

THE romantic province of the Tyrol adjoins Salzburg and Upper Austria to the westward of the latter. It is inhabited by a brave, industrious, and thoroughly religious people, devotedly attached to the Austrian rule, and who in the French and Italian wars proved not by words but by deeds that they would always defend, until death, their native soil against the enemies of the ruling family of Austria. The capital of the province is Innsbruck.

It contains the towns of Brixen, Botzen, and besides other small towns, Trent, the latter famous in ecclesiastical history. These latter places, however, are to the southward of the mountains, and within the valley of the Adige which descends towards the plains of Northern Italy. The Tyrol consists of nothing but mountains and small fruitful valleys. It is densely populated, and extends from Upper Austria across the ranges of the Eastern Alps to the shores of the Lake of Garda upon the Italian side of the mountain system, and embraces the upper portions of the valleys of the Inn and the Adige.

Two of its most celebrated passes are the Brenner and the Stelvio.

In a military point of view the Tyrol can be considered as a nearly impregnable fortress, having the command of all its approaches, and possessing the great advantage of requiring only a small army for its defence.

The main line of operations of the Garibaldians extended through the Giudicaria from the Lake of Idro, along the River Chiese, after that over the saddle of the Bondè, between Agrone and Tione, into the valley of Sarca, and finally out of this over Stenico and Vezzano towards Trent. The lines near and over the Tonale and Stelvio could only be considered of secondary importance. The passages in this neighbourhood had been fortified by the Austrians, but we cannot attach any importance to these works, and if they are now mentioned it is only to set the reader right in regard to a rather difficult ground. In fact these fortifications could not be considered as permanent. South of Lardaro, about 700 paces from the village, lies the fort Lardaro, a four-cornered tower, with a palisade. Three other small redoubts completed the system of this impediment. If we follow the Chiese from the Caffaro Bridge along the Italian and Austrian frontier, we reach after a few miles Storo, the first head-quarters of the volunteers. Before we arrive at Storo, on the right lies the valley of the Balneo Brook, which in the upper part is called the valley of Ampola; out of this we come to the Val di Ledro, and in the valley

beyond Tiarno to Bececca ; turning by the way of the Lake of Ledro at Tonale, we arrive at Riva, situated on the Lake of Garda. At the junction of the Valley Lorino with the Valley of Ampola, stands the small fort of Ampola, evidently intended to assist in barring the passage of an invading army.

In the lower Ledro valley, close to the Lake of Garda, is the fort S. Theodosio. The fortifications of Riva, at the Lake of Garda, and of the valley of Loppio and those towards Roveredo, we think need not be alluded to here. To the east of Riva, near Torbole, the Sarca discharges itself into the north end of the Lake of Garda. Further up is Sarche, situated on the main road to Trent, and if we continue on this route in a north-easterly direction, we arrive at the Doblino lake, with the old citadel of Doblino, lately rebuilt and fortified by the Austrians. This citadel may be considered as the most central and advanced point of the Austrian lines of defence. Proceeding on the main road by Vezzano to Trent, we arrive at another fortification which barricades the Buco di Vala, a narrow passage to the west of Cadine.

CHAPTER XII.

Operations of the Italians against the South of the Tyrol, during the months of June and July, under the command of Garibaldi and Medici.

ON the 25th of June the Austrians occupied the Stelvio Pass, and had advanced to Bormio in the Valteline. The Garibaldians pushed forward from Brescia to the bridge of Caffaro and Lodrone, on the mountain pass, where two roads branch off to Trent and Riva, on the Lake of Garda. At Lodrone, the Italians drove the Austrians from their positions, though not without bloodshed. The first real skirmish took place on June 26th, at Caffaro, near Salo, between a body of Austrian Volunteers and two companies of the Bersaglieri Lombardi, assisted by a company of Italian Regular Volunteers. Garibaldi, with his entire force, marched along the shores of the Lake of Garda to Desenzano, a distance of about ten miles. According to Italian accounts, there were at that time upwards of 20,000 Austrians in and about Salo, and reinforcements were daily expected.* On June 28th, the Austrians re-descended the Stelvio and occupied Bormio, driving the Italians back to Tiarno. On the 29th, Garibaldi was at

* This does not agree with Austrian accounts.

Lake Idro; the Austrians entered the Val Camonica and pushed on to Vezza. On the 30th, the headquarters occupied Lonato, and marched in the evening towards the Tyrolese frontier by way of Salo. On July 3rd, Garibaldi attacked the Austrians at Monte Suello. Protected by the strength of their positions the Imperial troops made a strong resistance, and the Volunteers finally fell back in good order upon Rocca d'Anfo. Among the killed was a Captain of Volunteers. Garibaldi was himself slightly wounded in the thigh. The ammunition of the Volunteers was rendered nearly useless by a heavy rain. The Garibaldians suffered some losses and returned to their former positions. At the same time an engagement took place between some Austrians and Volunteers at Rocca d'Anfo, a solitary fort, armed with a few guns and defended by a scanty garrison. It is about twenty-five miles from Salo.

After the fight of July 3rd, between the Italian Volunteers and the Austrians, the latter evacuated their positions on Monte Suello and the Caffaro. These positions were immediately occupied by Garibaldi's troops. During these movements, Austrian engineers were busily employed in the Stelvio, in order to render it practicable for the passage of artillery. On the 10th of July, the Italians were in possession of Rocca d'Anfo, and their advanced posts were at Bagolina, Porte Caffaro, and Storo.

On the 11th, an engagement took place between the flying columns of the National Guard and the Austrians, at Le Prese, on the Stelvio, which lasted the whole day. The National Guard occupied the 1st Cantoniera and took 75 prisoners; they had some wounded but none killed. After the occupation of Storo, it became necessary for Garibaldi to secure the two roads in front of the Giudicaria, and also the road through the Val Ampola, which has before been mentioned. The first-named would be of great importance as soon as the operations should assume a decisive aspect. At this time, from the best information that we can gain, the force under Garibaldi's command only amounted to 12,000 Regular Volunteers. These were divided into ten regiments and two battalions of Bersaglieri, and were formed again into five brigades. Their whole cavalry consisted of from 200 to 300 Guides, and their artillery was formed out of several batteries belonging to the standing army. We shall not enter into a description of the remaining irregular force of Garibaldi.

On July 16th, a skirmish took place at Storo. Garibaldi had intended occupying Rocca Pagana, but in the morning the Austrians appeared on the summit of the heights and commenced firing on the Garibaldians. After a short time, the Italian artillery, which was placed on the bridge of Storo, compelled them to retire through the Val Lorinz and Rocca Pagana. On the same day, the

Austrians attacked Condino, a few miles from Storo, the key of the position commanded by the fort Lardaro. These movements of the Austrians can only be regarded as reconnaissances. The loss on the Italian side was 100 men in killed and wounded. The next problem for the Garibaldians was undoubtedly to seize the fort Ampola. Garibaldi gave orders to that effect on the 19th of July. The whole garrison of this place consisted of only about 130 infantry and 20 artillerymen. About noon, after an obstinate resistance, the garrison capitulated, and after being disarmed are reported to have been liberated.

After the fall of Ampola, Garibaldi determined upon seizing the Ledro valley, and for this object he pushed the brigade Hanz over the entrance of the Val di Conzei as far as the lake of Ledro. On the 20th Garibaldi was informed that an Austrian corps was marching over the Monte Gaverdina towards the Val de Conzei, he therefore, in order to support the Hanz brigade, despatched the 5th Regiment Chiassi and the 9th Regiment Menotti Garibaldi to advance towards Bececca, a village which almost completely obstructs the southern entrance of the Val di Conzei. Chiassi arrived on the evening of the 20th of July at Bececca, and at daybreak on the following morning advanced one of his battalions towards Locca, on the heights on the eastern margin of the Val di Conzei. At the Chapel of Locca, this battalion was suddenly

attacked by superior Austrian forces, and pushed back upon the main body of the 5th Regiment, which was supported by three guns on their left wing, and made front at Bececca, but, in spite of further reinforcements, they had to evacuate the position.

In the meantime the Volunteers formed themselves at Santa Luzia, to the east of Tiarno di Sotto, and were supported here on their right by a new battery. This and the Hanz brigade being in the rear in the Ledro Valley, compelled the Austrians to desist from further pursuit of the rest of the Garibaldians. About noon the Austrians retired towards the Val di Conzei, and were followed by the advanced troops of the Garibaldians as far as Locca and Enguise.

The gallant Chiassi fell in this engagement.

The loss of the Volunteers on this day was considerable—about 500 dead and wounded and a great number of prisoners. The number of Austrians actually engaged on the 21st could hardly have been larger than that of the Volunteers. On the same day as the engagement in the Val di Conzei and at Bececca, the Austrians made another sortie from the fort Lardaro; they were checked by the 8th Regiment of the brigade Nicotera at Condino. This was the last engagement at this seat of war, and Garibaldi now endeavoured to occupy as much ground as possible before the ratification of the now unavoidable

armistice. In the Chiese valley he advanced as far as Pieve di Buono, which is situated a few miles to the south of Lardaro, and only nine miles from the Italian-Austrian frontier. One battalion of the Hanz brigade was pushed forward through the Val di Conzei, as far as Campi, in the neighbourhood of Riva.

Another battalion marched through the Val di Ledro against the fort S. Theodosio.

These several movements were facilitated by General Kühn recalling from the west all those troops which were not actually required in the defence of the several forts. The 4th Regiment of Volunteers and the 2nd battalion of Bersaglieri, belonging to the Puhi brigade, under the command of Colonel Cadolini, were posted first at Vezza towards the Tonale, to prevent the Austrians marching through the above-named passage, into the Val Camonica. After the unfavourable engagement which this detachment fought on the 4th of July, it took up a new position between Vezza and Edolo, close to Incudine. Here they remained unmolested till Garibaldi pushed forward towards Storo, when they received orders, on the morning of the 16th, to march back to Cedeyolo, and there to occupy the heights of the Val di Lay, on the frontier of the Tyrol. Shortly after, Cadolina evacuating the position at Incudine, several detachments of Austrians marched into Edolo, though without remaining there long.

On the Lake of Garda, during this period, the

small Austrian fleet under Captain Manfroni von Montfort kept absolute command. Having seen how much or how little Garibaldi effected in the South of the Tyrol, we will now proceed to describe the march of Medici's division. Medici received orders on the 20th of July, at Vigodarzeri on the Brenta, to advance through the Val Sugana against Trent. He marched by way of Cittadella and arrived on the 21st of July at Bassano; he had with him, according to Italian reports, eight battalions, two squadrons of cavalry, and three batteries. On the evening of the same day, he marched from Bassano to Carpano, from thence he detached one regiment over the heights, on the right, and another on the left side of the Brenta, to outflank the entrenchments which the Austrians had erected at the frontier village Primolano, and also the Austrian entrenchments, at Le Tezze, leading into the valley of the Brenta.

Medici marched with the main body on the morning of the 22nd, through the Covolo Passage, against the front of the Austrian entrenchments. The entire force defending these entrenchments consisted of only a battalion of about 700 men of the regiment Archduke Rainer, No. 59, under the command of Major Puhler, who having heard of the superior force and flank movements of the Italians, was naturally obliged to evacuate the entrenchments of Primolano; 5000 men in front and the same number in the rear, would cause some perplexity to only 700 men.

Major Puhler retired to Grigno, took up fresh positions there, made his report to Trent, and asked for reinforcements. These having been granted to him, he marched to Borgo di Val Sugana where he remained that night, to form a junction with the expected reinforcements.

Two battalions of the 9th Hartmann Regiment and 59th Rainer Regiment, were sent to support him, but only one of these battalions reached him in the forenoon of the 23rd at Borgo di Val Sugana, where Medici again attacked him. The other battalion had not got further than Pergine. Through the non-arrival of these men, the strength of the Austrians at Borgo di Val Sugana on the 23rd was only about ten companies, against 2000 men of the Medici division. Medici, who during the night of 22nd to the 23rd, was between Grigno and Le Tezze, commenced his march at eight o'clock on the morning of the 23rd; he reached the bridge over the Strigno brook, which, although barricaded, was not defended.

After about two hours' marching, and clearing away the impediments which had been constructed, in order to delay his advance, Medici continued his march to Borgo di Val Sugana, and at three o'clock the Italians were ready to attack this place. The fire from a battery at Castel San Pietro, north of Borgo, retarded their advance for a time. Medici therefore ordered a battalion of Bersaglieri to storm this work. At five o'clock the Italians entered

Borgo, where several street fights took place. The Bersaglieri drove the Austrians out of the town, and pursued them towards Levico, which place Medici occupied in the evening, after its evacuation by the Austrians. The Italians had been marching only a few hours during the 23rd, and had only encountered inferior numbers, yet they required rest; Medici therefore undertook nothing further during the 24th of July than to push forward his outposts from Levico to Pergine, a strong position eight kilometres from Trent, on the east side of the Lake Caldonazzo, and only an easy march from Trent to the south of the Lake Caldonazzo towards Vigolo, from Matarello, which is on the railway line from Trent to Verona. General Kühn, on hearing the result of Medici's operations of the 23rd, not only determined to defend Trent but also to commence operations, drive Medici's division back to the Val Sugana, and give him a crushing defeat. In order to effect this, General Kühn telegraphed in all directions, especially to Verona and the Castello of Doblino, for more troops. Verona, not being menaced, could well afford to spare out of her 20,000 men at least 5000; from the west he could get another 3000 men, and these together with those under his command, and those stationed in the neighbourhood of Trent, would give him a sufficient force to meet Medici's division. General Kühn declared to the Trentiners that he was determined to defend the town to the

last, and by these promises calmed down the excited state of the people.

It is a singular, but on all sides confirmed fact, that the inhabitants of South Tyrol showed hardly any sympathy for the Italian cause, and yet it was the general opinion of all Italians that South Tyrol, more than any other part of that country, was most anxious to get united to Italy. But there is no doubt that public opinion in Italy was led astray by a few young, enthusiastic, and energetic men of South Tyrol, who besides being always found fighting in the foremost ranks on all Italian battle-fields were equally ready and willing to give their lives, if this could further the union of their country with Italy. The accounts of these single individuals caused the Italians to give every inhabitant of South Tyrol credit for the same sympathies towards Italy. But this belief was in no way corroborated by the deportment of the South Tyrolese.

On the 25th of July another engagement took place at Val Sorda, between an Austrian detachment and the Italians advancing from Vigolo. The Austrian loss was about seventeen, including killed, wounded, and missing; that of the Italians rather less. Medici could have been hardly aware of this engagement, when he received the news of the armistice, which tidings he forwarded at once to General Kühn. The necessary arrangements in regard to the armistice were at once entered into between Medici and Kühn, and Garibaldi was immediately informed of it.

We think it necessary to append a part of a letter from the correspondent of the "Times," with reference to the final movements of Garibaldi and Medici.

The map shows that while Medici and his regulars were making their way through the Val Sugana, it would have been a natural and desirable movement on the part of Garibaldi, to march through the Cavedino Valley—Trent being taken as the rendezvous of the two columns—and that we must suppose was the object of Garibaldi's advance. The eastward march was evidently intended to gain the road through the Cavedino Valley, and so much had been heard of the progress made, of the reduction of the fort Ampola, and of the severe and successful engagements sustained by the Garibaldians, that we were surprised to hear Garibaldi's head-quarters were back at Storo, which is barely four miles from the frontier town of Caffaro, where the invasion of Austrian territory commenced. But it became interesting to learn the motive for so remarkable a change, and investigation would probably show that he found it impossible to get forward with the ill-supplied army of irregulars he commanded, although he was assisted by five batteries and one regiment of the regular army.

CHAPTER XIII.

Causes which led to the failure of Garibaldi's Expedition.

THE cause of Garibaldi's ill success is attributed by many to the want of proper support from the Ministry of war in the equipment of his troops; and also to a bad selection of officers, together with a certain jealous feeling supposed to be entertained by General La Marmora. As regards the greater part of these statements, we are of a totally different opinion. If an attempt be made to conquer a country by exciting a rebellion, assisted by an invasion, the political state and feeling of its inhabitants towards its own government, and its invaders, and the materials by which this object is to be successfully carried out, must be first thoroughly considered.

Are there any refugees of the country, and are they numerous? To what class of society do these men belong? What have their antecedents been, and the real cause of their seeking protection and assistance?

After having obtained the above information, it must be ascertained whether the party intended to be supported is strong enough, with the invading force, to obtain partial possession of the country. Were these points ever thoroughly inquired into

before the expedition took place? We believe they could never have been: that is to say, if the Italian Government ever really intended driving the Austrians out of the Tyrol.

We now beg our readers to compare the political state of Naples, and Sicily, at the time of Garibaldi's Sicilian expedition, with that of the Tyrol when Garibaldi attempted to invade it; in order to prove that the public are wrong in supposing that because Garibaldi was able to annex Sicily, he could do the same with the Tyrol. The military history of the Tyrol would also show what kind of resistance he might expect to receive. The reader should remember the materials which composed Garibaldi's irregular army, and that of the Neapolitan forces, in his first expedition.

We believe that the men and officers who composed Garibaldi's first expedition were, as soldiers, superior to his second. There were, no doubt, amongst his first expedition a great number of men and officers who had seen a good deal of service in nearly every part of the world, and some of the officers were accustomed to regular and irregular warfare, which rendered them fully capable of handling the daring spirits they commanded. As regards the equipment of his second expedition against the Tyrol, we believe that there was such an immense quantity of work to be done, in equipping Victor Emanuel's and Cialdini's army, in order to enable them to take the field at a moment's notice,

that it was utterly impossible to do the same effectually with Garibaldi's forces; and it was no fault of the Minister of war or of La Marmora's, for had the war been continued, we feel convinced that Garibaldi's men would have been properly looked after. But then, it is said that Garibaldi's army was partly composed of men who belonged to the first and richest families of Italy, serving in the ranks. If such be the case, why did they not come forward like the planters of the Southern States, who paid their men and fought with them? We all know that there was quite sufficient time for these Garibaldians to have made up a large sum of money, for the purchase of arms for their poorer comrades. As regards the appointment of officers, and any feeling of estrangement which existed between them and Garibaldi, any soldier can easily account for it. If a man has served from his boyhood in a regular service, his ideas and military habits, which civilians often consider very narrow and limited, compel him to regard his superior with a certain degree of distrust, should he have happened to have fought against him on the side of rebellion. Italians will some day thank the generals for this feeling of military discipline, when Italy becomes a great military power, and nothing will assist more in the regeneration of Italy than the opinion ascribed to Victor Emanuel, viz., that every man should be trained to be a soldier in the regular service.

Piedmont would never have fought her desperate battles had not her troops been thoroughly imbued with it. There is no doubt that one of the most difficult tasks allotted to General La Marmora, was the appointment of fit and competent officers to command under Garibaldi. It could not be expected from him to deprive his king's army of its best officers; and moreover, military men do not like to leave the men whom they command and know, to join irregulars who are totally unknown to them. In conclusion, the reader must fully understand that Garibaldi's attempt to invade and excite a rebellion in the Tyrol was a most difficult and desperate enterprise. The public has never been informed of any Tyrolese of position having joined him; and that the materials which he had at his command were totally inadequate to subdue such a race of men as the hardy mountaineers of the Tyrol, renowned for their loyalty towards their Emperor, and the heroic resistance they have offered to every invader of their humble and happy homes. In fact, too much was made out of the Neapolitan annexation; as Garibaldi, physically speaking, could not be considered to represent the Garibaldi of the Sicilian expedition; and Italians who know the state of their own country, cannot blame the government, or the officers, or any one else, for Garibaldi's ill success.

CHAPTER XIV.

Description of Dalmatia.

DALMATIA is a long narrow strip of land lying along the eastern shore of the Adriatic between the chain of the Dinaric Alps and the coast. It is a rugged and mountainous country, but fertile and productive, both in the valleys and on the adjoining hills. A long chain of islands fronts the coast. Dalmatia, with a small portion of the Albanian coast which belongs to Austria, is attached nominally to the Crown of Hungary. Its inhabitants are industrious and enterprising mariners, settled at various points along the small extent of coast line of the province or upon the numerous adjacent islands.

In the first part of the work, we have drawn the attention of the reader to those movements of the Prussian troops, which would ultimately have an effect on the Italian War. After the defeat of Königgrätz, the real meaning of the Prusso-Italian Alliance came to light, and this was the dismemberment of the Austrian empire and its reduction to an inland province. The advance of the Prussians into Hungary, with their revolutionary agents, was a miserable and dastardly attempt, to excite a rebellion amongst a nation, which, although for years ruled by a mistaken policy, has shown to Europe that it fully understands the rights of the subject and sovereign, and that the only way to obtain these rights is by constitutional means.

One of the old proverbs handed down to us by former generations says that "everything is fair in love or war," but we cannot think that the latter part of this sentence applies to a king who openly avows that crowns are given to kings not by the people but by God, unless divine inspiration, or his counsellor St. Bismarck, of Gottesgnaden, informed his Majesty the King of Prussia that he, like one of the favoured rulers of Israel, was to carry fire and sword into the land of the Austrians, and take the crown from his brother sovereign. Some years ago we knew something about Istria and of the regions about Trieste, but we never heard of, or saw any inclination amongst these different nations to become Italians; the only sympathy shown towards foreign nationalities was of a Russian or Slavonic Greek tendency, and we can only say we cannot understand why any part of the population, although speaking the Italian dialect, should wish to be under the rule of Italy. Simply for this reason; they knew that if they were Italians they would be exterminated by the warlike races that surrounded them, whose existence and future prosperity depended solely and entirely on getting the seaboard into their possession.

The way in which the unexpected attack on Lissa was met by its inhabitants, and their cheers as they poured their murderous fire into the Italian fleet, must have convinced the Italians that they were not looked upon as friends.

CHAPTER XV.

Battle of Lissa and the importance of the Dalmatian coast in relation to the commercial prosperity of Austria.

WE shall now attempt to describe the naval operations of the Austrian and Italian fleets. A naval engagement took place, in which Admiral Tegethoff proved that the Austrian fleet commanded the Adriatic, which from its being the first engagement in which any large number of ironclad ships have ever been engaged, gave to this battle a great naval importance, and it can be considered as one of the greatest victories of its kind. Persano, who is reported to have left Ancona on the 12th of July, in order if possible to find and attack the Austrian fleet, returned after a few days' cruise with the information that it was securely anchored in the harbour of Pola, guarded not only by double rows of land batteries at the water's edge, but also by a shoal of torpedoes, and it seems that Persano did not think it advisable to attack the Austrians.* This inactivity caused a great deal of disquietude in public opinion, and it increased to such a degree that after a lengthened consultation with the Minister of Marine, Persano at last determined once more

* The Austrians do not describe the defences of Pola to have been of such a formidable character.

to put to sea, and, assisted by a large number of troops, to take the island of Lissa in order eventually to obtain Istria. Lissa lays about thirty-five miles south-west of Spalato; between it and the shore are the islands Lesina, Brazza, and Solta. Lesina is separated from Lissa by a channel about four miles broad. The possession of this island has in former times been contended for by Russians, English, and French, but came at last, in the year 1815, with Dalmatia, into the possession of Austria. Its waters are celebrated for being the scene of one of our naval victories over the French. Since the year 1815, Lissa has lost a great deal of its former prosperity: then it contained about 20,000 inhabitants, but at present it numbers only about 7000.

From east to west it is not quite two miles in breadth, from north to south about five miles in average. Besides several minor creeks, it possesses two main ports; the principal military port is S. Giorgio, and is on the north-east side of the island. The other port, larger and better fortified, but more shallow, is situated on the west side and called Comisa. The Austrians use Lissa as a large naval depôt for coals and commissariat stores. The island is connected by a submarine telegraph, first with Lesina and then on to Spalato. In this neighbourhood are the Rock Islands, Busi, St. Andrea, and Pomo; to the east lays Melisello; Busi lays quite close to the west side of Lissa, and the distance of Pomo from the latter island is about

twenty-four miles. At about three o'clock in the afternoon of the 16th of July, Admiral Persano put to sea from Ancona with the following fleet, composed of twenty-eight vessels; viz., eleven ironclads, four screw frigates, one screw corvette, two paddle-wheel corvettes, four despatch boats, four gunboats, one hospital ship, and one storeship.

The frigate "Garibaldi" remained at Ancona to be refitted, and the despatch boat "Cristoforo Colombo," remained as guardship. The despatch-boat "Flavio Gioja," was sent to Gargano to cruise about, and to order several vessels which were expected from Tarento and Brindisi to join the fleet at Lissa, amongst them the ram "Affondatore." When the Italian fleet weighed anchor, it is said that the chief of Persano's staff, D'Amico, left the port in a disguise, and went on board a small coasting ship bound for Lissa, to find out the best spot for landing, and generally to reconnoitre. The greater part of the Italian fleet went in a north-easterly direction towards the island of Lossin, in all probability to deceive the Austrians as to their real intentions, and it was only towards evening that they shaped their course in the direction of Lissa. On the morning of the 17th of July, D'Amico joined the fleet and made his report regarding the batteries of S. Giorgio and Comisa, their number of guns and other results of his reconnoitring. Persano then gave the following instructions:—Rear-Admiral Vacca, with the ironclads "Principe di Carignano,"

"Castelfidardo," "Ancona," and the paddle sloop "Guiscardo," were to bombard Porto Comisa, which depends more on the natural strength of its position than on its fortifications, which were of a very inferior kind; the main part of the fleet, viz. :—eight ironclads, the paddle sloop "Ettore Fieramosca," and the despatch boat "Messaggiero," under the command of Persano, were to attack the main port, S. Giorgio. Vice-Admiral Albini, with the wooden frigates, "Maria Adelaide," "Gaeta," "Duca di Genova," "Vittorio Emanuele," and the sloop "San Giovanni," were to try to effect the landing of the troops under Commander Wonale at the small port—Porto Manega—in rear of the port of S. Giorgio.

Commander Sandri, with the gunboats, was to go to Lesina to destroy the submarine telegraph, and all other means of communication. The despatch boat "Esploratore" received orders to cruise to the north, between Pomo and the Dalmatian coast, off the point of La Bianca at Old Trau; the despatch boat "Stella d'Italia" was to cruise between S. Andrea and Pelagosa, in the south. The hospital ship "Washington" and the storeship "Indipendenza" were to remain at Busi. Vacca commenced to bombard the works of Port Comisa, but he soon convinced himself that owing to his having approached too near the works, which were a tolerable height above the surface of the sea, his guns could not be sufficiently elevated to have any effect. If

they had kept at a sufficient distance to enable them to fire without a high elevation, their guns, unless of the heaviest calibre, would have had little effect on the works; and as his ships were ironclads, which generally lie low in the water, and possess but one battery, this naturally placed him at a great disadvantage; and this will always be the case whenever ships of this class have to engage with batteries of any height.*

Vacca then left Porto Comisa and steered towards Porto Manego, where Albini had been equally unsuccessful in his attempt to effect a landing. Vacca therefore steered straight for Persano, who, at about four o'clock in the forenoon, commenced the bombardment of the Port S. Giorgio. Four ironclads, under the command of Commodore Ribotti, were to advance from the east against the northern works of the port. Persano reserved the southern works to be dealt with by the frigate "Garibaldi," which shortly after joined its squadron from Ancona. About half-past one in the afternoon, one of the powder magazines belonging to the works on the entrance of the port blew up and partly destroyed an Austrian battery; this was done by Persano's vessels. About three o'clock Ribotti's vessels blew up another magazine, and the Austrian

* To obviate this defect, two new systems have been introduced—the French Emperor's and Captain Cole's, and we must say that, after seeing the Solferino and Magenta, the French system appears the most practicable.

forts at the entrance of the port were for the time silenced, with the exception of the telegraph battery. At this time Vacca joined Persano's squadron. The Italian admiral ordered the "Formidabile" to anchor in the entrance of the harbour. The "Maria Pia" and the "San Martino" were to advance into the inner harbour and to silence the inner batteries. Vacca was to engage with his vessels the telegraph works. These orders were executed so slowly that darkness prevented their accomplishment, and Persano was obliged to defer his further operations to the following morning. The landing at Porto Manego was relinquished, and was to be effected at Porto Carobert, to the south of S. Giorgio, on the 19th of July. For this purpose the Italian fleet, with some exceptions, was concentrated on the evening of the 18th, about 6 o'clock, towards the height of the harbour S. Giorgio. Captain Sandri with his gunboat squadron also joined them from Lesina, after having executed his orders. During the night of the 19th, the fleet was further strengthened by the arrival of the two screw frigates, "Principe Umberto" and "Carlo Alberto," the paddle sloop "Governolo," and the ram "Affondatore." On board these vessels were a considerable body of troops from Brindisi and Ancona. On the evening of the 18th, Persano received a communication to the effect that the Austrian fleet had left their anchorage during the afternoon; in this supposition

he was entirely in error; the Austrians were only getting ready to start for Lissa.

From the anchorage of Fasana at Pola to Lissa is a distance of 180 English miles. If, therefore, a vessel is running at the rate of ten knots an hour, this distance could be accomplished in fifteen hours; at six knots, in twenty-five hours. A fleet will always move slower than a single first-class vessel; a fleet should always keep together, and the consequence is that the slowest vessels will have to regulate the rate of sailing, and the fastest vessels will accordingly have to increase or slacken their speed; and, taking it all in all, we may calculate that a fleet, consisting of even first-class vessels, would not make more than seven knots an hour. If the Austrian fleet had really left the anchorage of Fasana on the evening of the 18th of July, then it could hardly be expected to have reached Lissa before the evening of the 19th, when darkness would probably have prevented the commencement of hostilities.

Persano therefore gave for the 19th of July the following orders. Albini was to effect a landing with his wooden vessels assisted by the gunboats under the command of Commander Sandri. The two ironclads, "Terribile" and "Varese," were to bombard Porto Comisa; the ironclad, "Formidabile," was to enter the port of S. Giorgio, and if possible to silence the inner batteries. Vacca, with the "Principe di Carignano," "Castel-

fidardo," and "Ancona," was to support the "Formidabile," while the "Re di Portogallo" and the "Palestro," with their heavy guns, were to open fire against the Telegraph Fort, and Persano, with the "Re d'Italia," "S. Martino," and the "Maria Pia," would support Albini in landing the troops.

The execution of these dispositions was deferred from hour to hour, because Persano during the forenoon of the day apprehended Tegethoff might suddenly surprise him while his fleet was thus divided, and only in the afternoon of the day, after the different cruisers which had been sent on the look-out reported no sail or steamer in sight, did the fleet commence the execution of their different operations.

The "Formidabile," Captain St. Bon, went gallantly into the harbour of S. Giorgio, and in spite of her being received by a heavy fire from all the inner batteries, she engaged the main battery of the Austrians from a distance of only about 400 paces. She suffered here considerably, principally from a battery on the north side of the harbour, and which was out of range of her guns.

Persano gave orders to the "Affondatore" to engage this battery with her 300-pounders, but this, as a matter of course, could be of no great consequence, as we are of the opinion that the gunners did not understand the working of these heavy pieces, and in fact they sometimes mistook the cartridges.

Vacca advanced with his three ironclads into the entrance of the harbour, and opened a heavy fire on the inner batteries, which he for a time partly silenced, but the Austrians after a slight delay renewed their fire with such vigour that Vacca was compelled to retire, and he was unable to afford any effectual assistance to the "Formidabile," on account of the Austrian batteries being partly covered by her, coupled with the fact that the narrowness of the harbour prevented any manœuvring. The "Formidabile," kept her position till dark, although she had fought most bravely she was totally unsuccessful in silencing the Austrian batteries. The projected landing was also a failure, and during the whole of the 19th the wind blew pretty freshly from the south-east, this, with the heavy surf, prevented the boats from getting near the shore.

For these reasons Persano gave orders to postpone the landing until the following day. The "Formidabile" lost, during the engagement of the 19th of July, about sixty men, dead and wounded, and was obliged to go to Ancona for repairs.

On board of the "Ancona," Captain Piola commanding, twenty-three men were killed and wounded through the bursting of an Austrian shell. During the night of the 19th to the 20th of July all available ironclads were kept in line of battle at the anchorage in front of San Giorgio.

Early on the morning of the 20th of July, the

screw steamer "Piemonte" arrived, and Persano had now upwards thirty-four vessels under his command. On the morning of the 20th the weather was stormy, with heavy rain; in spite of this, Persano, at three o'clock, gave orders to effect a landing. All the vessels under the command of Albini had to carry out this order, and lowered their boats, but owing to the heavy surf could effect nothing. The two ironclads, "Terribile" and "Varese," were ordered by Persano to renew their bombardment of Comisa. All the rest of the vessels were ordered to take up their positions for the renewal of the attack on Lissa. At about eight o'clock A.M., the Italian fleet was in the following positions:—Albini and Sandri, with their respective large wooden vessels and gunboats, were trying to effect a landing at Porto Carobert; the "Terribile" and "Varese" were getting ready to bombard Porto Comisa; the "Formidabile" was transferring her wounded to the hospital ship "Washington;" the "Re d'Italia," "Portogallo," and "Castelfidardo," were repairing their machinery, and the rest of the ironclads, with their steam up, were awaiting further orders off S. Giorgio. It was at this time, and during a heavy fall of rain and storm from the north-west, that the "Esploratore" came in sight and signalled; first, suspicious vessels in sight, and shortly afterwards, the enemy from the north. It was Admiral Tegethoff with the Austrian fleet.

THE BATTLE OF LISSA.

Rear-Admiral Tegethoff had repeatedly received telegraphic messages regarding the movements of the Italian fleet, and at a later period, their attack on Lissa. It is supposed that he considered this to be merely a demonstration in order to entice him away from the Istrian coast, so that the Italians might have free play in those waters. On the 19th of July he received information by telegraph, from the Austrian general commanding at Zara, of such a description as to leave no doubt on his mind that the Italians really intended taking Lissa, and making it a basis for their further operations. Tegethoff, like an able commander, at once put to sea, with the intention of attacking the enemy, and relieving Lissa, although he had only four ships ready to start, but was shortly after joined by the remainder of his squadron. His fleet was divided into three divisions. The first division, under the personal command of Tegethoff, consisted of the ironclads "Archduke Ferdinand Max," (flagship), "Hapsburg," "Emperor Max," "Don Juan d'Austria," "Prince Eugen," "Salamander," and the "Dragon." The second division consisted of the heavy wooden vessels, viz., the screw line-of-battle ship, "Kaiser," the screw frigates "Novara," "Duke Schwarzenburg," "Count Radetzky," "Adria," "Donau," and the screw sloop "Archduke Frederic." This division

was commanded by Commodore Petz, with his flag on board the "Kaiser." The third division consisted of the light wooden vessels, viz., the screw gunboats "Hum," "Dalmat," "Reka Streiter," "Seehund," "Velebich," and "Wall," together with the auxiliary screw ships "Narenta" and "Kirka." Each division consisted of seven vessels. The four paddle steamers, "Empress Elizabeth," "Andreas Hofer," "Stadium," and "Greif," were attached to the fleet as despatch boats. The number of vessels belonging to the whole fleet amounted, therefore, to twenty-five, with 531 guns. Tegethoff left Fasana on the 19th of July, at about noon. On the morning of the 20th of July, at about seven o'clock, the enemy was reported several times in sight, but probably this was only the Italian reconnoitring ship, the "Esploratore," which must have been seen repeatedly and at different distances.

There was at this time a heavy gale, accompanied by squalls of rain, and when at intervals the sun penetrated the cloudy horizon, then the islands, Pomo, St. Andrea, and Melisello, could be seen in the distance. Tegethoff was steering along the coast of Dalmatia, from north-west to south-east, and on arriving opposite the heights of Zerna and Solta, he altered his course from north to south. At this time the wind gradually calmed down and veered round to the north-west, and the horizon suddenly clearing up, the two opposing fleets came in view of each other.

When Persano received the news of the approach of the hostile fleet, he at once gave orders to form line of battle, and for the wooden vessels to discontinue their attempts to effect a landing and rejoin the fleet. When the action began, there were only ten ironclads ready to fight. These vessels were ordered by Persano to steer W.S.W. They were, between nine and ten o'clock, in the direction from E.N.E., and formed in the following order:—"Maria Pia," "Varese," "Re di Portogallo," "San Martino," "Palestro," "Affondatore," "Re d'Italia," "Ancona," "Castelfidardo," and "Principe di Carignano." Of these ten vessels, only the following three were light ones:—"Principe di Carignano," "Palestro," and "Varese," the rest were heavy vessels. We have got up to the present three different divisions steering W.S.W., the first, the real rearguard, but for the time taking the lead, was composed of the "Maria Pia," "Varese," and "Re di Portogallo," with Commodore Ribotti's flag.

The second division, composed of the "S. Martino," "Palestro," "Affondatore," and "Re d'Italia," with Admiral Persano's flag, constituted the main body. The third division consisted of the "Ancona," "Castelfidardo," and "Principe di Carignano," the flagship of Rear-Admiral Vacca, and should have originally formed the vanguard. Persano now changed his course from a southerly to a more westerly, so that the ironclads were

almost steering due west. The weather clearing up, and Persano perceiving the enemy so near, and at the same time observing that his three divisions were keeping at too great a distance from each other, gave orders by signal—each vessel to go about and follow in the wake of the “*Principe di Carignano*.” Through this movement the intended order of battle would have been completed, always supposing that the vessels kept their proper distances, and arrived in their proper places in time to meet the attack. Unfortunately for Italy this supposition was not to be fulfilled, at all events the whole fleet instead of steering from east to west, took their course from west to east, the “*Principe di Carignano*” taking the lead, and the “*Maria Pia*” bringing up the rear. During the execution of this movement Persano with the chief of his staff, D’Amico, and the two lieutenants, Gaudiano and De Lucca, left the “*Re d’Italia*,” his flag-ship, and went on board the ram “*Affondatore*.”

Among the many accusations which after and in consequence of the battle of Lissa, were brought against Admiral Persano, those were the most galling which referred to the “*Affondatore*.”

Almost every journal asserted that Persano had gone on board the “*Affondatore*” principally for his personal safety. In the official Report regarding this matter, it is stated that Persano’s main object in going on board the “*Affondatore*” was

to be on board of an iron-clad of superior speed, and to remain outside the line of battle, so that he might watch the course of the fight, and be always prepared and ready to deal a decisive stroke wherever an opportunity occurred, and further to convey the necessary orders to the different vessels under his command. This would reduce the supposed finest and most powerful ship of the whole Italian fleet either to a reserve vessel or a despatch boat. These two duties the "Affondatore" never could perform at one and the same time. As a reserve vessel she rendered no service whatever during the battle of Lissa.*

It has been further asserted that Persano never hoisted his flag on board the "Affondatore" at all, but it remained flying on board of the "Re d'Italia;" this assertion, although officially disputed, is supported by several incidents which happened during the battle.

When Tegethoff sighted the Italian fleet distinctly, the course of the ironclads was about from west to east; each single vessel had just put about,

* The only excuse which is alleged is that no opportunity offered itself to Admiral Persano, but we believe that when he got on board the "Affondatore" he found that the reported statement made by her captain before leaving England with regard to her many defects was perfectly correct, and in fact, if we compare the antecedents of the "Re d'Italia" and the "Affondatore," it was a case of jumping out of the frying-pan into the fire. This just supposition is greatly strengthened by the ultimate fate of the two vessels.

several vessels were not quite ready, and all their distances were faulty.

Besides the nine ironclads which Tegethoff first observed, he on his nearer approach to the enemy's fleet perceived a second Italian line, which he supposed was endeavouring to form a junction with the fleet of ironclads. But regarding this supposition he was in error, this second line being in fact the division under Albini, who could have only required but a very short time to prepare for the fight, and was now only executing Persano's first order, to form line with his ships heading about west by south. Albini's fleet then consisted of eight heavy wooden vessels and several smaller ones. The Italian wooden ships took hardly any active part in the fight, except to fire several rounds from a great distance against the Austrians. We find here equally the want of unity as we did on shore; and it seems the cause of the slowness of Albini's movements has never been clearly ascertained, and this must strike us the more when we consider the excellent use the Austrian Admiral made of his wooden vessels in connection with his ironclads.

The Austrian attack should not have taken Persano by surprise, because there was no doubt he was well aware of Tegethoff's intentions, and had fully twenty-four hours to prepare for action.

The Austrian formation was in three lines behind one another, the first line was formed of the iron-

clads, the second of the heavy wooden vessels, and the third of the light wooden vessels. As we have before mentioned each of the lines consisted of seven vessels, and therefore it will be easy for us to number the vessels of each division from the right to the left, from No. 1 to No. 7, the vessel No. 4 would therefore form the centre of its respective division; the vessels No. 1 of the 2nd and 3rd division were steering therefore in the wake of the vessel No. 1 of the 1st division; the vessels No. 2 belonging to the 2nd and 3rd divisions were steering in the wake of the vessel No. 2 of the 1st division, and so on.

It is reported that it was Tegethoff's intention, first to hoist the signal "We must conquer at Lissa," but seeing the enemy so close, he omitted doing so, and confined himself to giving by signal the more necessary instructions to his fleet.

Persano on board of the "Affondatore" behind the line of ironclads could not be aware of the enemy's movements, and we may mention here, that according to the oldest rules of naval warfare, the Admiral's flagship should either lead, or be in the centre of the line of battle.

Vacca now gave the "Carignano" a more northerly course, so that his division came parallel with the left wing of the Austrian ironclad division; and the "Carignano" opened fire at a distance of about 200 metres; Vacca tried to steam by this division with the intention of attacking the Austrian

wooden vessels, but through this manœuvre he increased the distance between his division and the second or central division (headed by the "Re d'Italia") which was consequently left unprotected. While this was going on Tegethoff signalled to his fleet—the vessels of each division to keep their proper distances, the intervals to close, the back division to close well with their front division, and the ironclads to run down the enemy's opposing line.

Tegethoff, with his ironclad division at full speed, went into the gap between Vacca and the Italian central division, and attacked the latter; the object of the attack was the "Re d'Italia," Capt. Faa di Bruno, who, although having to repel the onslaught of three Austrian vessels at once, fought his ship with the utmost bravery. The "Archduke Ferdinand Max," Tegethoff's flagship, Captain Daublebsky, ran several times into the "Re d'Italia," and caused her considerable damage. Faa di Bruno tried, by putting on full speed, to reach the "Ancona," and so to join Admiral Vacca's division, but the "Re d'Italia's" rudder having got damaged he now gave orders to board, when, through the holes that had been stove in by the "Ferdinand Max," the ship seemed to stagger like a drunken man, a frightful cry was heard, an immense gulf seemed to open amid the waves, and then wide spreading circles were seen upon the face of the water which had again become smooth. The "Re

d'Italia" had ceased to exist. The "Palestro," nearest the "Re d'Italia," tried to assist her, but was fiercely attacked by the "Ferdinand Max" and several other Austrian ironclads. Shortly after a fire broke out on board the "Palestro," and her rudder having also been damaged, she retired towards the northwest point of the island Lesina.

We think it our duty to mention the following daring feat performed by a large number of marines on board the "Re d'Italia," who, as the ship was sinking, rushed into the rigging and delivered a deadly volley on the crowded decks of the "Archduke Ferdinand Max."

Persano sent the "Governolo" to assist the "Palestro" in rescuing her crew, in case they should not succeed in extinguishing the fire on board of her. Capt. Capellini, commanding the "Palestro," refused with his crew to leave the ship, and only asked to be towed to the leeward of the ironclad division. This was done through the assistance of the "Governolo" and "Indipendenza;" in retiring the "Palestro" passed the "Affondatore," who still persevered in keeping her original position, behind the line of battle.

After passing the "Affondatore" the "Palestro" blew up. Her captain and crew shouting "viva il Re," "viva l'Italia." Thus two of the best vessels of the active Italian ironclad central division, the "Re d'Italia" and "Palestro," were lost; the third vessel of this divi-

sion, the "San Martino," Capt. Roberti, instead of affording the "Re d'Italia" any assistance was only endeavouring to protect herself and keep out of harm's way. The three vessels belonging to the Italian central division had been fighting every one of the seven ironclads belonging to the first Austrian division, together with three wooden vessels; the Italian central division had to succumb, but did so with all honour. Each of the vessels fought with the utmost heroism, and the "Re d'Italia" as well as the "Palestro," although vanquished, are certain to keep their place in history. After having related the engagement of the Italian second division, and even having forestalled the fate of the "Palestro," which occurred at a later period, let us speak now of the first and then of the third Italian divisions. The 1st Italian division, consisting of the "Principe di Carignano," "Castelfidardo," and "Ancona," commanded by Admiral Vacca, had steered N.E. along the left wing of the Austrian ironclad division and exchanged with it several broadsides. After the "Carignano" had passed the line of the ironclad division, Vacca gave orders to his fleet to turn to the left and to steam straight through the 2nd and 3rd Austrian divisions, thereby causing these wooden ships considerable damage by firing into them; principally the line-of-battle ship, "Kaiser," Commodore Petz, with the flag of the 2nd division. Vacca seeing that every thing went wrong, and in the belief that Persano had gone

down with the "Re d'Italia," gave himself the signal to form at once one line. The rear division, Commodore Ribotti, composed of the "Re di Portogallo," "Varese," and "Maria Pia," during the time the central division was engaged, rushed on towards the wooden vessels, and thus placed them between two fires. Commodore Ribotti on board of the "Re di Portogallo," with the assistance of the "Maria Pia," selected the line-of-battle ship "Kaiser," Commodore Petz, for their attack. Petz used his wooden ship like a ram, ran into the quarter of the "Re di Portogallo" with full speed, and laid her alongside of the Italian vessel. The three-decker enveloped in smoke appeared like a huge elephant standing at bay against a pack of hounds. Her gunners were nearly all Dalmatians, whose cheers as they fought their guns, told the Italians what kind of brothers they were meeting.

But being at the same time attacked by the "Maria Pia," the "Kaiser" was rather roughly handled, she lost her bowsprit, her bows were partly stove in, her foremast coming down carried away her funnel, and so brought the "Kaiser" into imminent danger of catching fire. Under these circumstances Commodore Petz thought it advisable instead of carrying on a lengthened attack to bring his ship into safety. However he was shortly to be supported. The "Re d'Italia" was sunk, the "Palestro" burning, and drifting slowly towards Lesina. The Austrian ironclads had rendered the Italian central division

harmless. Tegethoff was staying, and trying to save some of the crew of the "Re d'Italia," but according to the Austrian official accounts was prevented from doing so by the Italians who fired into the boats which were endeavouring to pick the men up. When Tegethoff saw that his ironclads were nearly inactive, and the 3rd Italian division was steering into the Austrian wooden vessels, he gave orders to his ironclads to go about and steer north, to relieve the wooden vessels; and they went again to the attack under cover of which the line-of-battle ship "Kaiser" was towed towards Lissa out of the range of the Italian guns.

The smoke was so intense and caused such darkness, that the two contending fleets could hardly discern friend from foe, and even the grey hulls of the Italian ships could hardly be distinguished from the black hulls of the Austrian men of war.

Tegethoff signalled to form three divisions with a north-easterly ~~course~~, so that the ironclads came nearest to the Italian fleet, and the two divisions formed of the wooden vessels could ~~form~~ themselves behind their ironclads. This movement brought the Austrian fleet in front of the channel between Lissa and Lesina and north-east of Lissa. The paddle-steamer "Elizabeth" was ordered to assist the line-of-battle ship "Kaiser." Simultaneously with this Austrian movement Vacca gave orders to his ironclads to form in his wake, and shortly after that he had collected the "Principe di Carignano,"

"Castelfidardo," "Re di Portogallo" and "Varese;" the "Ancona," "S. Martino," and "Maria Pia" came to him some time afterwards. This line steering a westerly course tried to take the "Palestro" up, but this latter vessel's magazine having caught fire she blew up at about five o'clock, and Vacca's line now took a more rapid westerly course. The battle was now virtually at an end.* Vacca's line was at this time about three or four miles distant from Tegethoff's foremost ironclad division. The first shots were fired at half-past ten o'clock, A.M., from the "Principe di Carignano" at the left wing of the Austrian ironclad division, and the battle lasted therefore about four hours, during which time the "Affondatore" never once attempted to act in her real capacity as a ram, against any vessel of the enemy's fleet, the only active part she took during this time was to fire from a great distance several of her heavy shots against some of the Austrian vessels. It was only after the engagement was virtually at an end that we see Admiral Persano taking command of his fleet, by steaming with the "Affondatore" to Vacca's line, which was then steering a due west course, and taking the lead (according to authentic private accounts), gave orders to follow his movements; this could not signify anything else but to give up the contest, because the farther he steered west the greater

* It is stated that Vacca would have renewed the fight had he not received orders to the contrary from Persano.

would become the distance from the Austrian fleet. For a better enlightenment we subjoin here the official account, depending mainly on Persano's statement.

After having fired the first shot against the Austrian Admiral's ship, the "Affondatore," Captain Martini, tried to ram her, but the enemy's vessel perceiving this, steamed with full power against the "Affondatore's" quarters and backing out fired a broadside against her; the "Affondatore" replying with her bow guns, and with her helm hard to starboard, ran right through the Austrian line of wooden vessels, all of which avoided her contact; she now again steered for the Austrian Admiral's ship which, declining from the stern of the "Re di Portogallo," again avoided her onslaught. Now, the "Affondatore" emerging from the smoke hoisted the signal to attack the enemy. When Admiral Persano saw that the wooden vessels of the enemy, with their Admiral's ship on their right, were steering due east under cover of the 1st division, and their 2nd division was trying its utmost to form themselves again during the time it was menaced by the Italian vanguard, he thought that by a rapid movement in steaming between the enemy's ironclads and wooden vessels he might divide his fleet. He therefore hoisted the signal—Give chase, with full liberty as to course and movements.

The "Affondatore" now steamed back to the

Italian fleet, so that each single vessel might see her signal, to hasten their movements. But the favourable moment was gone, the enemy had by ~~this~~ time succeeded in covering his wooden vessels ~~and~~ uniting his ironclads. Admiral Persano therefore ~~determined~~ to form a fresh line of battle and again to ~~attack~~ the enemy. The Austrian fleet was during ~~this~~ time equally occupied in forming themselves, ~~and~~ with their head to the north and their ironclads on ~~their~~ left, were putting about towards Lissa. At twenty ~~minutes~~ past three the formation of the Italian fleet in two ~~divisions~~ was completed, the wooden vessels, with the "Principe Umberto," were to the right with their bows towards Lissa. The "Affondatore" taking the lead steered toward the enemy, at the same time opening her fire, while the Austrian fleet continued its course toward Lissa and Lesina. Whether this is true or not is a question that we do not attempt to decide.

It is stated that these movements of the "Affondatore" were not perceived by Admiral Tegethoff nor his fleet, and the Austrian official account states that he only saw the Italian fleet retreating in a westerly direction. It was sufficient to know that both divisions were gradually retiring out of these waters. When the Austrians were certain of the Italian fleet having retreated toward Ancona, they put about; a part of them entered Lissa, and the remainder went off in a south-

easterly direction behind the island in order not to waste their coals, and to enable those vessels which were more or less damaged to be repaired. The whole of the 21st of July was spent in this way; during this time the "Dalmat" and the "Empress Elizabeth" were cruising in front of S. Giorgio and saved the lives of many belonging to the sunken Italian vessels "Re d' Italia" and "Palestro." Tegethoff sent at once a steamer to Spalato, from whence the news of the victory was forwarded by telegraph to Vienna; the Emperor telegraphed back his thanks, and gave him his promotion. This news was brought by the steamer "Venezia" from Spalato, and she took the badly wounded to Spalato and Zara. The dead were interred at Lissa, and those badly wounded, who could not be transported, were taken to the hospitals of the place. The refitting of the line-of-battle ship "Kaiser" was completed on the evening of the 21st, and after having ascertained that the Italians had not returned to the waters of Lissa, Tegethoff with his whole fleet, between eight and nine o'clock, put to sea to return to his anchorage off Fasana. The losses of the Austrians in the battle of Lissa were not inconsiderable, the "Kaiser" alone counted 22 dead, and 82 wounded. The loss of the Italians was considerably higher, and is estimated at 900 men. The principal loss occurred on board of the "Re d'Italia" and "Palestro," while the other vessels

only lost 8 dead and 40 wounded, among them 4 officers. Only 172 men were saved from the "Re d' Italia's" crew, and only 16 men of the "Palestro's" crew saved their lives. According to the official and unofficial accounts the Italians were told that the battle of Lissa resulted in a decisive victory for them, that several of the Austrian vessels were lost, among them Petz' flagship "Kaiser."

For four days Italy rejoiced in the idea, and considered the same as being a revenge for Custoza. But this jubilation did not last long, for the real facts of the case were to appear shortly after in the following shape. Tegethoff relieved Lissa, the Italians did not conquer it. Persano after leaving the waters of Lissa, during the night of the 20th to the 21st, steered for Ancona. The Austrians did not lose a single vessel; although their line-of-battle ship "Kaiser" was damaged, the officers and crew succeeded in bringing her safe out of battle. The Italians, on the other hand, lost during the engagement two of their finest vessels. It is an extraordinary coincidence that the very ship which bore the name of his Majesty the King of Italy was sent to the bottom, by his supposed would-be subjects, together with the reported future governor of Istria, celebrated for his diary of his interview with the Pope.

With reference to the way in which the Italians fought their ships, their opponents say, as regards personal valour no men could have behaved better;

but if it be true that an Italian ship of war saluted an English ship with ball instead of blank ammunition, in the Bay of Naples, before the battle of Lissa, and during the action fired blank ammunition at the Austrian ships, the Italians cannot wonder at their having lost this battle. It is merely what we have before stated, the Italians attempted too much.

In a former portion of this work, we expressed ourselves as non-believers in the principle of the unity of races, on account of their speaking a similar tongue. We maintain as before that no permanent unity could exist unless promoted by a common interest. This is the great principle upon which the Austrian question of unity is founded. The question is, what are the common commercial interests of the Austrian Empire? we believe they consist in the development of its gigantic resources, but these resources are of no use unless they can be sold or exchanged for machinery and other goods. It is therefore the duty of the Austrian government to facilitate to their utmost the means of communication of the provinces with the principal towns of the empire, and connect these towns with its small seaboard, which is the centre of the many races which compose the Austrian Empire, by means of railways; for a great man once said, "If you wish to unite a nation bind it together with rods of iron." But the work of the Austrian ruler must not stop here. Peaceful merchants will not build

warehouses in seaports if they are not protected; nor will they trust their merchandise and ships on the wide ocean, unless they are defended by a strong Navy. It is therefore the duty of Austria to at once strongly fortify the seacoast, and largely increase her Navy.

We have often heard Austrians say, that the reason why they can never possess a large Mercantile Navy or Fleet is on account of the small seaboard and scanty maritime population. This is a great mistake, for many thousands of our best seamen have never seen the sea until they join their ships, and we believe that the greater part of our Marines are recruited from inland counties, and some of our best Admirals came from our agricultural districts. As regards the Austrian seaboard it possesses great advantages. Besides having some of the finest harbours in the world in which entire fleets can take refuge, the fact of its small extent and the position of its ports renders its defence a very easy matter; and if a fleet ever effected a landing of troops they could never penetrate into the inland provinces of Austria, on account of the range of mountains which separates the inland provinces from the sea-coast.

CHAPTER XVI.

Cause of the Italian Defeat.

THE Italians were exasperated at this great disaster, and disappointed in their fondly-cherished hopes, which consisted in not only proving themselves masters of the Adriatic, but also being able to annex a country under the plea that it was a kin nationality, which would have been the ruin of the entire Hungarian nation.

The Italians madly demanded a strict enquiry of the guilty parties, and all eyes were directed to Persano as the most blameable. The most incredible and virulent stories were circulated against him.

There is no doubt that Persano committed great faults in the Battle of Lissa, but we put it to our Naval readers, especially men in high command, do they themselves think that it could be expected from a man like Admiral Persano to understand the management of a fleet, composed of a large number of ironclad vessels? Naval History could not guide him, the records of the late American War gave him little or no information as regards the management of a naval engagement, in which any considerable number of ironclads were employed. 2ndly, How long had his captains been

accustomed to command ironclad ships, had they ever engaged land batteries, or encountered a similar foe on the sea? Every sailor is aware that it takes some time to know a ship. The writer, in order to illustrate his reasoning, asks his reader what is the supposed cause of the former misfortunes of the Great Eastern?

The chief charges brought against Admiral Persano were as follows:—

1st. How was it that under his superintendence the fleet which had cost the State so much should be in an inefficient state? We shall attempt to answer this question in the following way, by calling the attention of our readers to the faulty system which exists in our Naval departments. Could it be expected that Italy which had only existed a few years could create a great Naval establishment which should be so perfect in all its ramifications as to be able to equip and put to sea a fleet equal to any of the secondary powers of Europe. It had to buy its ships, it had to buy nearly everything, not excepting experience, but unfortunately, the principal thing, experienced commanders, could not be purchased.

2nd. What was Persano's reason for not attacking Pola, the real object of the war, instead of Lissa? We believe that it was not thought advisable to attack Pola after the 4th of July, because the effecting of a landing on that part would be a declaration of the intention of dismembering the

Austrian Empire, by assisting the movements of the Prussian troops in Hungary, and it was therefore thought more advisable to get possession of Lissa and then afterwards create a revolution in the neighbouring coasts.

And if failing in this latter attempt, the possession of Lissa would to some extent counterbalance the defeat of *Qustozza*, together with any check which Cialdini might receive, and at all events enable them to treat on a certain degree of equality with Austria.

3rd. What was Persano's reason for shifting his Flag at the eleventh hour from the "*Re d'Italia*" to the "*Affondatore*"?

The results of the battle proved unmistakeably that in his turret ship he was deprived of an open view of the action, his signals were not perceived, and the battle was fought with scarcely any order or direction on his part.

4th. We now come to that which the public supposes to be the most serious charge, viz.:—Why did Persano, knowing the enemy's plan of attack, divide his strength by simultaneously attacking Porto S. Giorgio and Porto Comisa, and also by trying to effect a landing, at about the time when he must have known that the Austrian fleet was under weigh? In order to answer this question, the first question is, Did he know the plan of the Austrians, and what were Persano's real orders as regards Lissa? Did he know the exact state

of the fortifications and the political feeling of its inhabitants?

From the number of troops he had on board he must have received orders to effect a landing, and having failed on the 18th was he not bound to make the attempt again on the 19th, this is the only reason which can be brought forward in Persano's favour, if he could depend upon the reconnoitring vessels giving him a timely notice of the approach of the Austrian Fleet. This landing could only be effected by dividing the attention of the enemy.

Was there not sufficient time for the Italian fleet to come in order of battle after Persano had received notice of the approach of the Austrian fleet before they had arrived within gunshot, as it is a well-known fact that the horse power of the Italian fleet was far superior to that of Tegethoff? In order to prove that it was not entirely the fault of Persano, we shall mention the following circumstance:—Albini with the wooden vessels, at the commencement of the action, was hardly 4000 paces distant from the Ironclads and therefore in a quarter of an hour could have easily come to their assistance; if we further consider that the whole north-west of the island of Lissa in front of which the engagement took place is only a few miles in length, and the distance was so small that any vessel which was not badly disabled could and ought to have accomplished it in less than an

hour. We have seen that the engagement between the Italian Ironclads and the Austrian fleet lasted about four hours.

Before concluding the description of this engagement we think it our duty to say a few words as regards the leadership of the Austrian fleet. But before speaking of Admiral Tegethoff we think we are bound to render our homage to the Archduke Maximilian, the present Emperor of Mexico, who, to his credit be it said, foresaw that the development of the Austrian resources must necessitate her possessing a fleet which would protect a Maritime Trade and rule the waters of the Adriatic. But we regret to say that the Austrian Government was not of his opinion, it did not know that it possessed some of the very best sailors of the Mediterranean, and there is no doubt that the former Venetian Republics had a large number of Dalmatians in their service. On this supposition it was considered as throwing money away in purchasing toys for the Archduke to amuse himself with; and every gulden was spent on the soldier. Those who know the Austrian marine and its officers know the men to possess the highest qualities of a sailor, and its officers are nearly without exception men of considerable ability. The fleet at the time of the Italian War was undergoing a great change as regards its equipment and armament, in fact the guns with which some of the ships were obliged to be armed, were of an old and inferior

quality, because they could not obtain the guns which had been ordered in foreign countries. Tegethoff as before stated, put to sea in a very inferior state, but his fleet possessed two great advantages; good sailors who were burning with a desire to prove to their countrymen that their reported disaffection to the crown of Austria was false, and officers who knew how to handle and fight their ships; yet we fully believe that Tegethoff in his modesty never for one moment thought that he should gain such a glorious victory and prove to the world that he was the first Admiral who had ever fought a battle in which a large number of ironclad and wooden ships had to be manœuvred, and no one will deny that he and Commodore Petz proved that they fully understood this new combination.

We have not attempted to enter into a minute description of the Austrian and Italian fleets. With reference to the former, we refer our readers to Capt. Brackenbury's description of it; as regards the Italian, we shall only quote a remark which we heard made by an Anglo-Italian friend before the war, viz.:—To judge from the number, size, and destructive power of the Italian fleet, I believe if they ever meet the Austrians they must either blow them into atoms, or cut them in pieces.

CHAPTER XVII.

Review of the future policy of Italy, and her Commercial difficulties. Reasons for her not disarming.

IN the first place, all the great military powers of Europe, appear to be preparing themselves for some great event. Secondly, it would seem decreed by fate that Italy's intended mission should be to free the Greeks, and assist them in forming one great and united Greek Empire.

There is no doubt that a very large and comprehensive reduction would have been made both in the army and navy, and in all their subordinate establishments, immediately after the declaration of peace with Austria, had not such alarming events occurred in the Turkish Empire. The past glories of both countries seem to point out that of the two nations, the one which first gained its liberty should assist the other. We know that Italy alone could not free Europe from the dishonour of compelling Christians to be ruled by Mahometans, merely for the interest of the two most civilized nations of the world. For this who could be so powerful an ally for Italy as the Emperor of Austria? Shall it be denied his subjects, the Hungarians, to complete that great blow they gave to the Turks when a large part of Europe stood in imminent danger of becoming a Turkish province?

Another and still greater end to be obtained by this Holy War, would be the probability of a reconciliation between the Italian and Greek churches. The Pope could then freely give his benediction to the warriors who went forth to defeat the Mussulmans, and heal the greatest wound ever inflicted on the Catholic religion. The only two nations who might attempt to prevent this glorious triumph of Christianity, are Prussia and Russia. Prussia, we have no doubt, would wish to see a Prussian Prince ruling the greater part of the Danubian principalities, and thereby become a standing menace to the free commerce of the Danube, and at the same time be always ready to make an inroad into the Hungarian provinces of Austria.

Russia, on the other hand, it is supposed, would wish to see a Greek Church under the complete dominion of the Czar, and the formation of a Russian Greek Kingdom with Constantinople as its capital, with the command of the Black Sea. From England, as her declared policy of non-intervention in European disputes prevents her from an armed interference, Italy and Austria have nothing to fear. The writer shares the opinion of many of the leading journalists, that as long as England obtains the Protectorate of Egypt, it matters not to her what becomes of the Turks. And we believe that England ought to induce France to join her in this Protectorate, and thereby

renew our alliance with her. If France did so, she would naturally require a part of the Syrian coast, or an extension of her Algerine territory along the shores of the Mediterranean. But this must be coupled with the formation of a Syrian Empire under the rule of the Sultan of Turkey—in case of his giving up his European possessions—which, with the above alliance, would bar the advance of Russia to our Eastern possessions. If the peace of Europe is to be maintained, the entrance of the Black Sea must be always in the possession of a Neutral Power, and that power would naturally be the Empire of Syria. The development of the Italian marine renders it of the highest importance for her to obtain possession of some of the Turkish islands as naval depôts for her fleet.

When we speak of the renewal of the alliance with France, we belong to those who consider that that alliance ceased to exist after our refusal to join in the recognition of the independence of the Southern States, which we followed up by declining to enter into the Congress, and also to assist France in the defence of the Danes; purely for the development of the greatness of a dynasty solely on the ground that it was related to the Royal Family of England. But in order to obtain support for these views, we are told that a great Prussia will serve as a check on France, and also aid in the development of constitutional government in Europe. With reference to the former,

Prussia is at present not only considered as a standing menace by France, but also by those countries which border on her frontiers, viz., Belgium, Holland, Switzerland, and Austria. We shall not include the Russo-German provinces, because we consider that the peculiar principles on which the House of Hohenzollern is established, render Prussia the dynastic ally of Russia. As regards the development of constitutional liberties, we refer our readers to articles written in the *Times* on the way in which elections are conducted in the dominions of the Protestant ally of Italy and England. On these grounds we cannot be astonished if France attempts to effect an alliance with Russia on the Eastern Question.

To counteract any attempt on the part of Prussia and Russia, France, who has no doubt by this time seen the mistake she and England made by joining in a war against Russia, will inform Europe that the eldest son of the Catholic Church would consider such an attempt an insult to the religion of France, and tantamount to a declaration of war.

If Italy wishes for a long duration of peace, it is better for her as soon as possible to decide all questions which have any reference to her being called upon at any future time to take a warlike position in the affairs of Europe. In all human probability after the Eastern Question is decided, she will have peace for many years to come. It is better, there-

fore, in order to avoid all future expense in creating a new army and navy, that she should at once make use of the present forces before dismissing them; for nothing depresses the commercial enterprise of a nation more than an uncertain peace. If she does not seize the present favourable opportunity we believe that Russia and Prussia will be beforehand with her.

The writer considers that the financial difficulties of Italy are not entirely owing to the creation of her large army and navy, but have been partly contributed to by her commercial policy. We will attempt to prove this, by stating the simple fact why, in our opinion, England was the first to advocate free trade. It was found that the raw material could be imported from any part of the globe, and when manufactured in England could be exported and sold at a less price than the native manufacturer could produce it, although grown on the spot. To introduce indiscriminately the rules of free trade into a country like Italy, which has immense undeveloped resources, is to risk far greater financial ruin, than if that country had been waging a war for many years. The effects of war can be remedied by industry, but commerce can never be prosperous unless protected in its youth. In order to prove this, we refer the reader to a statement made by the mechanics of Australia to the Trades Unions of England with reference to the evils of unlimited free trade being

introduced into a country, where the smallness of the import duties renders it impossible for the mechanics to produce articles at an equal price with those introduced into the Colony. There is no doubt that the system of free trade, like the system of free government, is a thing for which the people must be prepared. As long as the manufacturing enterprise of the Italians is not protected, Italy must always be dependent upon the foreigner. In fact it will drive native enterprise from the country. What Italy requires are the resources of machinery and capital. If Italians consider and look about them a little, they will see that all the profits are at present obtained by the stranger, and all her wealth since her independence has been continually going out of the country. She must exact high protective import duties upon every class of article she can manufacture from raw produce sold her by foreign merchants. This must be connected with low duties on every species of machinery, and as the manufacturing enterprise of the country becomes developed so will the duties on manufactured articles be diminished, and that on machinery increased, until they arrive at the free trade equilibrium.

For an instance how a State can restore its finances to a partial equilibrium, after one of the most gigantic wars that the world has ever witnessed, by high restrictive duties, we beg to refer our readers to the present commercial policy of the

United States. As a country which has not yet been able to compete to a great extent with the English manufacturers, she has by high restrictive duties up to the present moment, not only improved the state of her finances, but also her manufacturing interest in almost every branch. Those who suffer, on this side of the ocean from this policy, pretend that manufacturers of the United States will be ruined when a repeal of the duties takes place; the same thing was said some few years ago by the opponents of free trade. When the Americans have paid off their debt, and her manufacturers can compete with ours, a repeal of these duties will gradually take place. In conclusion we would remark that our theory only applies to those countries which have large undeveloped resources.

CHAPTER XVIII.

How Italy can regain any prestige she may have lost in the
Austro-Italian War.

ITALY, we believe, has lost no prestige in the late war; so far from this she has gained by it. The Austrian generals who served against the Italians and Piedmontese from the time of Radetzky up to the battle of Custozza, declare that the Italians never fought so well as they did on that day. History can produce no such example of the formation, in so short a space of time, of so large a state as the Italians have effected, with its State religion as its chief opponent. No country of the same extent as Italy has been able years after its formation to bring into the field a well-equipped army of 600,000 men, and put to sea a fleet equal if not superior to any of the second class maritime powers. It was not the want of having brave and courageous soldiers and sailors which caused her defeat, it was her attempt to do what armies led by the most renowned generals of Europe had failed to accomplish. As regards the navy, experience was wanting, yet still no one can blame the Italians for this desperate enterprise: the patriot's heart often overcomes his judgment. The alliance of Austria and Italy in the attempt to form a Greek empire would afford Italy the oppor-

tunity of proving to Europe what her army and navy could do.

Before the commencement of hostilities between Austria, Italy, and Prussia, we believe that some of the Cabinets of Europe were in doubt whether the cession of the Venetian territory would be detrimental to the interests of Austria, and that she would require a territorial compensation for the above transaction, and we are of this opinion. But no one doubted for one moment that Venetia for her own commercial interests must eventually become united to Italy. The writer of this work considers that the diplomatists of the day attempt to lead Europe to the belief that the future destinies of the Turkish empire cannot be foretold. We know Bosnia, Servia, Bulgaria, Albania, Roumelia, and the other provinces of European Turkey, are supposed to be known to the outer world only as names of unknown races. But we believe that the great English and French railway firms and loan speculators could give very good statistics of these provinces. What the public do know is, that these provinces are under the rule of a country which from its own peculiar religious opinions retards their prosperity and has compelled them several times to attempt to throw off their yoke, which some of them have now partially effected, and formed themselves into semi-independent states. But their unity can never be lasting so long as their religion and interest are at variance

with each other. At the same time their political parties greatly depend on the foreign powers of Europe in aiding them to obtain political supremacy, and in return these political parties must support the foreign speculator whose Government assists them. We believe that the existence of the Turkish Empire depends greatly upon the goodwill of European speculators, and as long as there is any money to be made out of the "sick man," they will do their best to keep him alive. In the supposition of a general insurrection of the Christians against the Ottoman rule, the question is, who ought to become the part owners of that empire. First of all comes Greece by the right of tradition, and her attempt to form the great Hellenic state, coupled with the important fact that the greater part of the population are of the same religion and connected by the ties of commercial interest.

Next to that state comes Austria, who the writer has above stated must have a certain territorial compensation and an increase of her seaboard for the loss of Venetia, and as she rules over races on the Danube who are connected by affinity of race and religion, backed by commercial interest, to some provinces belonging to the Turkish empire, she by the great efforts she made in former years against the Turkish rule, deserves to become the ruler of these territories. We now come to one of the most extraordinary feats of diplomacy. The Prussian

Prince who rules over a part of the Turkish empire, is supposed by many to be the person whom Count Bismarck intends to support as the successor and ruler of the greater part of the Ottoman empire, and is now attempting to gain Russia to support him. And now as to Russia. It is believed that Russia, on the dismemberment of the Turkish empire, will attempt to obtain the entire possession of it; but the writer is not of this opinion, he believes that Russia will divide the territory of Turkey with Prussia, and allow the King of Greece to remain, as a sort of tributary prince, either to herself or the Prussian Prince (we mean the would-be future Danubian King), and the Protectorate of Egypt will be offered to England and France. But we have not the slightest doubt that Russia intends obtaining possession of the Holy Places, although perhaps she will place them under the nominal sway of the King of Greece.

There is no doubt that Russia's natural ally is Prussia, and she will do all she can secretly to enable Prussia to absorb Holland and obtain possession of its colonies. This will enable Prussia to keep France and Austria in check, so that Russia would be able to devote her entire energies towards the East. The development of the Prussian navy in the Indian Ocean must necessarily weaken the maritime power of England and France. And Prussia must know that if she is able to conclude

a permanent alliance with Russia, she has nothing to fear from the Anglo-French alliance. For we believe that America will always be found ready to assist these two Powers.

THE END.





